P 297 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC SECOND DIVISION TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC INTRODUCTION I TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSION WE have already entitled dialectic in general a logic of illu- sion. This does not mean a doctrine of probability; for prob- ability is truth, known however on insufficient grounds, and the knowledge of which, though thus imperfect, is not on that account deceptive; and such doctrine, accordingly, is not to be separated from the analytic part of logic. Still less justification have we for regarding appearance and illusion as being identi- cal. For truth or illusion is not in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it, in so far as it is thought. It is therefore correct to say that the senses do not err -- not because they always judge rightly but because they do not judge at all. Truth and error, therefore, and consequently also illusion as leading to error, are only to be found in the judg- ment, i.e. only in the relation of the object to our understand- ing. In any knowledge which completely accords with the laws of understanding there is no error. In a representation of the senses -- as containing no judgment whatsoever -- there is also no error. No natural force can of itself deviate from its own laws. Thus neither the understanding by itself (uninfluenced by another cause), nor the senses by themselves, would fall into error. The former would not, since, if it acts only accord- ing to its own laws, the effect (the judgment) must necessarily be in conformity with these laws; conformity with the laws P 298 of the understanding is the formal element in all truth. In the senses there is no judgment whatsoever, neither a true nor a false judgment. Now since we have no source of know- ledge besides these two, it follows that error is brought about solely by the unobserved influence of sensibility on the under- standing, through which it happens that the subjective grounds of the judgment enter into union with the objective grounds and make these latter deviate from their true function, -- just as a body in motion would always of itself continue in a straight line in the same direction, but if influenced by another force acting in another direction starts off into curvilinear motion. In order to distinguish the specific action of under- standing from the force which is intermixed with it, it is neces- sary to regard the erroneous judgment as the diagonal between two forces -- forces which determine the judgment in different directions that enclose, as it were, an angle -- and to resolve this composite action into the simple actions of the under- standing and of the sensibility. In the case of pure a priori judgments this is a task which falls to be discharged by tran- scendental reflection, through which, as we have already shown, every representation is assigned its place in the corresponding faculty of knowledge, and by which the influence of the one upon the other is therefore likewise distinguished. We are not here concerned with empirical (e.g. optical) illusion, which occurs in the empirical employment of rules of understanding that are otherwise correct, and through which the faculty of judgment is misled by the influence of imagina- tion; we are concerned only with transcendental illusion, which exerts its influence on principles that are in no wise intended for use in experience, in which case we should at least have had a criterion of their correctness. In defiance of all the warnings of criticism, it carries us altogether beyond the empirical employ- ment of categories and puts us off with a merely deceptive exten- sion of pure understanding. ++ Sensibility, when subordinated to understanding, as the object upon which the latter exercises its function, is the source of real modes of knowledge. But the same sensibility, in so far as it in- fluences the operation of understanding, and determines it to make judgments, is the ground of error. P 298 We shall entitle the principles whose application is confined entirely within the limits of possible P 299 experience, immanent; and those, on the other hand, which profess to pass beyond these limits, transcendent. In the case of these latter, I am not referring to the transcendental employ- ment or misemployment of the categories, which is merely an error of the faculty of judgment when it is not duly curbed by criticism, and therefore does not pay sufficient attention to the bounds of the territory within which alone free play is allowed to pure understanding. I mean actual principles which incite us to tear down all those boundary-fences and to seize posses- sion of an entirely new domain which recognises no limits of demarcation. Thus transcendental and transcendent are not interchangeable terms. The principles of pure understanding, which we have set out above, allow only of empirical and not of transcendental employment, that is, employment extend- ing beyond the limits of experience. A principle, on the other hand, which takes away these limits, or even commands us actually to transgress them, is called transcendent. If our criticism can succeed in disclosing the illusion in these alleged principles, then those principles which are of merely empirical employment may be called, in opposition to the others, im- manent principles of pure understanding. Logical illusion, which consists in the mere imitation of the form of reason (the illusion of formal fallacies), arises entirely from lack of attention to the logical rule. As soon as attention is brought to bear on the case that is before us, the illusion completely disappears. Transcendental illusion, on the other hand, does not cease even after it has been de- tected and its invalidity clearly revealed by transcendental criticism (e.g. the illusion in the proposition: the world must have a beginning in time). The cause of this is that there are fundamental rules and maxims for the employment of our reason (subjectively regarded as a faculty of human know- ledge), and that these have all the appearance of being ob- jective principles. We therefore take the subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts, which is to the advantage of the understanding, for an objective necessity in the deter- mination of things in themselves. This is an illusion which can no more be prevented than we can prevent the sea appearing higher at the horizon than at the shore, since we see it through higher light rays; or to cite a still better example, P 300 than the astronomer can prevent the moon from appearing larger at its rising, although he is not deceived by this illusion. The transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing the illusion of transcendent judgments, and at the same time taking precautions that we be not deceived by it. That the illusion should, like logical illusion, actually dis- appear and cease to be an illusion, is something which tran- scendental dialectic can never be in a position to achieve. For here we have to do with a natural and inevitable illusion, which rests on subjective principles, and foists them upon us as objective; whereas logical dialectic in its exposure of de- ceptive inferences has to do merely with an error in the fol- lowing out of principles, or with an illusion artificially created in imitation of such inferences. There exists, then, a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason -- not one in which a bungler might entangle himself through lack of knowledge, or one which some sophist has artificially invented to confuse thinking people, but one inseparable from human reason, and which, even after its deceptiveness has been exposed, will not cease to play tricks with reason and continually entrap it into momentary aberrations ever and again calling for correction. II PURE REASON AS THE SEAT OF TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSION A Reason in general All our knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating the matter of intuition and bringing it under the highest unity of thought. Now that I have to give an explanation of this highest faculty of knowledge, I find myself in some difficulty. Reason, like understanding, can be employed in a merely formal, that is, logical manner, wherein it abstracts from all content of knowledge. But it is also capable of a real use, since it contains within itself the source of certain concepts and principles, P 301 which it does not borrow either from the senses or from the understanding. The former faculty has long since been defined by logicians as the faculty of making mediate inferences (in dis- tinction from immediate inferences, consequentiis immediatis); but the nature of the other faculty, which itself gives birth to con- cepts, is not to be understood from this definition. Now since we are here presented with a division of reason into a logical and a transcendental faculty, we are constrained to seek for a higher concept of this source of knowledge which includes both concepts as subordinate to itself. Following the analogy of concepts of understanding, we may expect that the logical concept will provide the key to the transcendental, and that the table of the functions of the former will at once give us the genealogical tree of the concepts of reason. In the first part of our transcendental logic we treated the understanding as being the faculty of rules; reason we shall here distinguish from understanding by entitling it the faculty of principles. The term 'principle' is ambiguous, and commonly sig- nifies any knowledge which can be used as a principle, although in itself, and as regards its proper origin, it is no principle. Every universal proposition, even one derived from experience, through induction, can serve as major premiss in a syllogism; but it is not therefore itself a principle. The mathematical axioms (e.g. that there can only be one straight line between two points) are instances of universal a priori knowledge, and are therefore rightly called principles, rela- tively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. But I cannot therefore say that I apprehend this property of straight lines in general and in itself, from principles; I apprehend it only in pure intuition. Knowledge from principles is, therefore, that knowledge alone in which I apprehend the particular in the universal through concepts. Thus every syllogism is a mode of deducing knowledge from a principle. For the major premiss always gives a concept through which everything that is subsumed under the concept as under a condition is known from the con- cept according to a principle. Now since any universal know- ledge can serve as major premiss in a syllogism, and since the understanding presents us with universal a priori propositions P 302 of this kind, they can also be called principles in respect of their possible employment. But if we consider them in themselves in relation to their origin, these fundamental propositions of pure understanding are anything rather than knowledge based on concepts. For they would not even be possible a priori, if we were not sup- ported by pure intuition (in mathematics), or by conditions of a possible experience in general. That everything that happens has a cause cannot be inferred merely from the concept of happening in general; on the contrary, it is this fundamental proposition which shows how in regard to that which happens we are in a position to obtain in experience any concept what- soever that is really determinate. The understanding can, then, never supply any synthetic modes of knowledge derived from concepts; and it is such modes of knowledge that are properly, without qualification, to be entitled 'principles'. All universal propositions, however, may be spoken of as 'principles' in a comparative sense. It has long been wished -- and sometime perhaps (who knows when! ) may be fulfilled -- that instead of the endless multiplicity of civil laws we should be able to fall back on their general principles. For it is in these alone that we can hope to find the secret of what we are wont to call the simplifying of legislation. In this domain, however, the laws are only limita- tions imposed upon our freedom in order that such freedom may completely harmonise with itself; hence they are directed to something which is entirely our own work, and of which we ourselves, through these concepts, can be the cause. But that objects in themselves, the very nature of things, should stand under principles, and should be determined according to mere concepts, is a demand which, if not impossible, is at least quite contrary to common sense. But however that may be (it is a question which we still have to discuss), it is now at least evident that knowledge derived from principles which are genuinely such is something quite different from knowledge obtained merely through the understanding. The latter may, indeed, also take the form of a principle and thus be prior to some other knowledge, but in itself, in so far as it is syn- P 303 thetic, it does not depend on thought alone, nor contain in itself a universal obtained from concepts. Understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, and reason as being the faculty which secures the unity of the rules of under- standing under principles. Accordingly, reason never applies itself directly to experience or to any object, but to understand- ing, in order to give to the manifold knowledge of the latter an a priori unity by means of concepts, a unity which may be called the unity of reason, and which is quite different in kind from any unity that can be accomplished by the understanding. This is the universal concept of the faculty of reason in so far as it has been possible to make it clear in the total absence of examples. These will be given in the course of our argu- ment. B The Logical Employment of Reason A distinction is commonly made between what is immediately known and what is merely inferred. That in a figure which is bounded by three straight lines there are three angles, is known immediately; but that the sum of these angles is equal to two right angles, is merely inferred. Since we have constantly to make use of inference, and so end by becoming completely accus- tomed to it, we no longer take notice of this distinction, and frequently, as in the so-called deceptions of the senses, treat as being immediately perceived what has really only been inferred. In every process of reasoning there is a fundamental proposi- tion, and another, namely the conclusion, which is drawn from it, and finally, the inference (logical sequence) by which the truth of the latter is inseparably connected with the truth of the former. If the inferred judgment is already so contained in the earlier judgment that it may be derived from it without the mediation of a third representation, the inference is called immediate (consequentia immediata) -- I should prefer to entitle it inference of the understanding. But if besides the know- ledge contained in the primary proposition still another judg- P 304 ment is needed to yield the conclusion, it is to be entitled an inference of the reason. In the proposition : "All men are mortal", there are already contained the propositions : "some men are mortal", "some mortal beings are men", "nothing that is not mortal is a man"; and these are therefore immediate conclusions from it. On the other hand, the proposition: "All learned beings are mortal", is not contained in the funda- mental judgment (for the concept of learned beings does not occur in it at all), and it can only be inferred from it by means of a mediating judgment. In every syllogism I first think a rule (the major premiss) through the understanding. Secondly, I subsume something known under the condition of the rule by means of judgment (the minor premiss). Finally, what is thereby known I deter- mine through the predicate of the rule, and so a priori through reason (the conclusion). The relation, therefore, which the major premiss, as the rule, represents between what is known and its condition is the ground of the different kinds of syllo- gism. Consequently, syllogisms, like judgments, are of three kinds, according to the different ways in which, in the under- standing, they express the relation of what is known; they are either categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive. If, as generally happens, the judgment that forms the con- clusion is set as a problem -- to see whether it does not follow from judgments already given, and through which a quite different object is thought -- I look in the understanding for the assertion of this conclusion, to discover whether it is not there found to stand under certain conditions according to a uni- versal rule. If I find such a condition, and if the object of the conclusion can be subsumed under the given condition, then the conclusion is deduced from the rule, which is also valid for other objects of knowledge. From this we see that in inference reason endeavours to reduce the varied and manifold know- ledge obtained through the understanding to the smallest number of principles (universal conditions) and thereby to achieve in it the highest possible unity. P 305 C The Pure Employment of Reason Can we isolate reason, and is it, so regarded, an independ- ent source of concepts and judgments which spring from it alone, and by means of which it relates to objects; or is it a merely subordinate faculty, for imposing on given modes of knowledge a certain form, called logical -- a faculty through which what is known by means of the understanding is deter- mined in its interrelations, lower rules being brought under higher (namely, those the condition of which includes in its own sphere the condition of the lower), as far as this can be done through [processes of] comparison? This is the question with which we are now provisionally occupying ourselves. As a matter of fact, multiplicity of rules and unity of principles is a demand of reason, for the purpose of bringing the understand- ing into thoroughgoing accordance with itself, just as the understanding brings the manifold of intuition under concepts and thereby connects the manifold. But such a principle does not prescribe any law for objects, and does not contain any general ground of the possibility of knowing or of determining objects as such; it is merely a subjective law for the orderly management of the possessions of our understanding, that by comparison of its concepts it may reduce them to the smallest possible number; it does not justify us in demanding from the objects such uniformity as will minister to the convenience and extension of our understanding; and we may not, there- fore, ascribe to the maxim any objective validity. In a word, the question is, does reason in itself, that is, does pure reason, contain a priori synthetic principles and rules, and in what may these principles consist? The formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms gives us sufficient guidance as to the ground on which the transcendental principle of pure reason in its synthetic know- ledge will rest. In the first place, reason in the syllogism does not concern itself with intuitions, with a view to bringing them under rules (as the understanding does with its categories), but with con- P 306 cepts and judgments. Accordingly, even if pure reason does concern itself with objects, it has no immediate relation to these and the intuition of them, but only to the understand- ing and its judgments -- which deal at first hand with the senses and their intuition for the purpose of determining their object. The unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a possible experience, but is essentially different from such unity, which is that of understanding. That everything which happens has a cause, is not a principle known and prescribed by reason. That principle makes the unity of experience possible, and borrows nothing from reason, which, apart from this relation to possible experience, could never, from mere concepts, have imposed any such synthetic unity. Secondly, reason, in its logical employment, seeks to dis- cover the universal condition of its judgment (the conclusion), and the syllogism is itself nothing but a judgment made by means of the subsumption of its condition under a universal rule (the major premiss). Now since this rule is itself subject to the same requirement of reason, and the condition of the con- dition must therefore be sought (by means of a prosyllogism) whenever practicable, obviously the principle peculiar to reason in general, in its logical employment, is: -- to find for the con- ditioned knowledge obtained through the understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion. But this logical maxim can only become a principle of pure reason through our assuming that if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions, subordinated to one another -- a series which is therefore itself unconditioned -- is likewise given, that is, is contained in the object and its connection. Such a principle of pure reason is obviously synthetic; the conditioned is analytically related to some condition but not to the unconditioned. From the principle there must also follow various synthetic propositions, of which pure under- standing -- inasmuch as it has to deal only with objects of a possible experience, the knowledge and synthesis of which is always conditioned -- knows nothing. The unconditioned, if its actuality be granted, is especially to be considered in respect of all the determinations which distinguish it from whatever P 307 is conditioned, and thereby must yield material for many synthetic a priori propositions. The principles arising from this supreme principle of pure reason will, however, be transcendent in relation to all appearances, i.e. there can never be any adequate empirical employment of the principle. It will therefore be entirely different from all principles of understanding, the employment of which is wholly immanent, inasmuch as they have as their theme only the possibility of experience. Take the principle, that the series of conditions (whether in the synthesis of appearances, or even in the thinking of things in general) extends to the unconditioned. Does it, or does it not, have objective applicability? What are its implications as regards the empirical employment of understanding? Or is there no such objectively valid principle of reason, but only a logical precept, to advance towards completeness by an ascent to ever higher conditions and so to give to our know- ledge the greatest possible unity of reason? Can it be that this requirement of reason has been wrongly treated in being viewed as a transcendental principle of pure reason, and that we have been overhasty in postulating such an unbounded completeness of the series of conditions in the objects them- selves? In that case, what other misunderstandings and de- lusions may have crept into the syllogisms, whose major pre- miss (perhaps rather an assumption than a postulate) is derived from pure reason, and which proceed from experience upwards to its conditions? To answer these questions will be our task in the Transcendental Dialectic, which we shall now endeavour to develop from its deeply concealed sources in human reason. We shall divide the Dialectic into two chapters, the first on the transcendent concepts of pure reason, the second on its transcendent and dialectical syllogisms. P 308 THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC BOOK I THE CONCEPTS OF PURE REASON WHATEVER we may have to decide as to the possibility of the concepts derived from pure reason, it is at least true that they are not to be obtained by mere reflection but only by inference. Concepts of understanding are also thought a - priori antecedently to experience and for the sake of experi- ence, but they contain nothing more than the unity of reflec- tion upon appearances, in so far as these appearances must necessarily belong to a possible empirical consciousness. Through them alone is knowledge and the determination of an object possible. They first provide the material required for making inferences, and they are not preceded by any a priori concepts of objects from which they could be inferred. On the other hand, their objective reality is founded solely on the fact that, since they constitute the intellectual form of all experience, it must always be possible to show their appli- cation in experience. The title 'concept of reason' already gives a preliminary indication that we are dealing with something which does not allow of being confined within experience, since it con- cerns a knowledge of which any empirical knowledge (perhaps even the whole of possible experience or of its empirical syn- thesis) is only a part. No actual experience has ever been com- pletely adequate to it, yet to it every actual experience belongs. Concepts of reason enable us to conceive, concepts of under- standing to understand -- ([as employed in reference to] percep- tions). If the concepts of reason contain the unconditioned, they are concerned with something to which all experience is subor- P 309 dinate, but which is never itself an object of experience -- something to which reason leads in its inferences from experi- ence, and in accordance with which it estimates and gauges the degree of its empirical employment, but which is never itself a member of the empirical synthesis. If, none the less, these concepts possess objective validity, they may be called conceptus ratiocinati (rightly inferred concepts); if, however, they have no such validity, they have surreptitiously obtained recognition through having at least an illusory appearance of being inferences, and may be called conceptus ratiocinantes (pseudo-rational concepts). But since this can be established only in the chapter on the dialectical inferences of pure reason, we are not yet in a position to deal with it. Meantime, just as we have entitled the pure concepts of understanding cate- gories, so we shall give a new name to the concepts of pure reason, calling them transcendental ideas. This title we shall now explain and justify. FIRST BOOK OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC Section I THE IDEAS IN GENERAL Despite the great wealth of our languages, the thinker often finds himself at a loss for the expression which exactly fits his concept, and for want of which he is unable to be really intel- ligible to others or even to himself. To coin new words is to ad- vance a claim to legislation in language that seldom succeeds; and before we have recourse to this desperate expedient it is advisable to look about in a dead and learned language, to see whether the concept and its appropriate expression are not already there provided. Even if the old-time usage of a term should have become somewhat uncertain through the careless- ness of those who introduced it, it is always better to hold fast to the meaning which distinctively belongs to it (even though it remain doubtful whether it was originally used in precisely this sense) than to defeat our purpose by making ourselves unintelligible. P 310 For this reason, if there be only a single word the estab- lished meaning of which exactly agrees with a certain concept, then, since it is of great importance that this concept be dis- tinguished from related concepts, it is advisable to economise in the use of the word and not to employ it, merely for the sake of variety, as a synonym for some other expression, but carefully to keep to its own proper meaning. Otherwise it may easily happen that the expression ceasing to engage the attention in one specific sense, and being lost in the multitude of other words of very different meaning, the thought also is lost which it alone could have preserved. Plato made use of the expression 'idea' in such a way as quite evidently to have meant by it something which not only can never be borrowed from the senses but far surpasses even the concepts of understanding (with which Aristotle occupied him- self), inasmuch as in experience nothing is ever to be met with that is coincident with it. For Plato ideas are archetypes of the things themselves, and not, in the manner of the cate- gories, merely keys to possible experiences. In his view they have issued from highest reason, and from that source have come to be shared in by human reason, which, however, is now no longer in its original state, but is constrained laboriously to recall, by a process of reminiscence (which is named philo- sophy), the old ideas, now very much obscured. I shall not engage here in any literary enquiry into the meaning which this illustrious philosopher attached to the expression. I need only remark that it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has some- times spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own in- tention. Plato very well realised that our faculty of knowledge feels a much higher need than merely to spell out appearances ac- cording to a synthetic unity, in order to be able to read them as experience. He knew that our reason naturally exalts itself to forms of knowledge which so far transcend the bounds of experience that no given empirical object can ever coincide P 311 with them, but which must none the less be recognised as having their own reality, and which are by no means mere fictions of the brain. Plato found the chief instances of his ideas in the field of the practical, that is, in what rests upon freedom, which in its turn rests upon modes of knowledge that are a peculiar product of reason. Whoever would derive the concepts of virtue from experience and make (as many have actually done) what at best can only serve as an example in an imperfect kind of exposi- tion, into a pattern from which to derive knowledge, would make of virtue something which changes according to time and circumstance, an ambiguous monstrosity not admitting of the formation of any rule. On the contrary, as we are well aware, if anyone is held up as a pattern of virtue, the true original with which we compare the alleged pattern and by which alone we judge of its value is to be found only in our minds. This original is the idea of virtue, in respect of which the possible objects of experience may serve as examples (proofs that what the concept of reason commands is in a cer- tain degree practicable), but not as archetype. That no one of us will ever act in a way which is adequate to what is con- tained in the pure idea of virtue is far from proving this thought to be in any respect chimerical. For it is only by means of this idea that any judgment as to moral worth or its opposite is possible; and it therefore serves as an indispensable founda- tion for every approach to moral perfection -- however the obstacles in human nature, to the degree of which there are no assignable limits, may keep us far removed from its complete achievement. ++ He also, indeed, extended his concept so as to cover specu- lative knowledge, provided only the latter was pure and given com- pletely a priori. He even extended it to mathematics, although the object of that science is to be found nowhere except in possible ex- perience. In this I cannot follow him, any more than in his mystical deduction of these ideas, or in the extravagances whereby he, so to speak, hypostatised them -- although, as must be allowed, the exalted language, which he employed in this sphere, is quite capable of a milder interpretation that accords with the nature of things. P 311 The Republic of Plato has become proverbial as a striking example of a supposedly visionary perfection, such as can exist P 312 only in the brain of the idle thinker; and Brucker has ridiculed the philosopher for asserting that a prince can rule well only in so far as he participates in the ideas. We should, however, be better advised to follow up this thought, and, where the great philosopher leaves us without help, to place it, through fresh efforts, in a proper light, rather than to set it aside as use- less on the very sorry and harmful pretext of impracticability. A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others -- I do not speak of the greatest happiness, for this will follow of itself -- is at any rate a necessary idea, which must be taken as fundamental not only in first projecting a constitution but in all its laws. For at the start we are required to abstract from the actually existing hindrances, which, it may be, do not arise unavoidably out of human nature, but rather are due to a quite remediable cause, the neglect of the pure ideas in the making of the laws. Nothing, indeed, can be more injurious, or more unworthy of a philosopher, than the vulgar appeal to so-called adverse ex- perience. Such experience would never have existed at all, if at the proper time those institutions had been established in accordance with ideas, and if ideas had not been displaced by crude conceptions which, just because they have been derived from experience, have nullified all good intentions. The more legislation and government are brought into harmony with the above idea, the rarer would punishments become, and it is there- fore quite rational to maintain, as Plato does, that in a perfect state no punishments whatsoever would be required. This per- fect state may never, indeed, come into being; none the less this does not affect the rightfulness of the idea, which, in order to bring the legal organisation of mankind ever nearer to its greatest possible perfection, advances this maximum as an archetype. For what the highest degree may be at which mankind may have to come to a stand, and how great a gulf may still have to be left between the idea and its realisation, are questions which no one can, or ought to, answer. For the issue depends on freedom; and it is in the power of freedom to pass beyond any and every specified limit. P 313 But it is not only where human reason exhibits genuine causality, and where ideas are operative causes (of actions and their objects), namely, in the moral sphere, but also in regard to nature itself, that Plato rightly discerns clear proofs of an origin from ideas. A plant, an animal, the orderly arrangement of the cosmos -- presumably therefore the entire natural world -- clearly show that they are possible only according to ideas, and that though no single creature in the conditions of its individual existence coincides with the idea of what is most perfect in its kind -- just as little as does any human being with the idea of humanity, which he yet carries in his soul as the archetype of his actions -- these ideas are none the less completely determined in the Supreme Understanding, each as an individual and each as unchangeable, and are the original causes of things. But only the totality of things, in their interconnection as constituting the universe, is com- pletely adequate to the idea. If we set aside the exaggera- tions in Plato's methods of expression, the philosopher's spiritual flight from the ectypal mode of reflecting upon the physical world-order to the architectonic ordering of it ac- cording to ends, that is, according to ideas, is an enterprise which calls for respect and imitation. It is, however, in regard to the principles of morality, legislation, and religion, where the experience, in this case of the good, is itself made possible only by the ideas -- incomplete as their empirical expression must always remain -- that Plato's teaching exhibits its quite peculiar merits. When it fails to obtain recognition, this is due to its having been judged in accordance with precisely those empirical rules, the invalidity of which, regarded as principles, it has itself demonstrated. For whereas, so far as nature is con- cerned, experience supplies the rules and is the source of truth, in respect of the moral laws it is, alas, the mother of illusion! Nothing is more reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what ought to be done from what is done, or to impose upon them the limits by which the latter is circum- scribed. But though the following out of these considerations is what gives to philosophy its peculiar dignity, we must mean- time occupy ourselves with a less resplendent, but still meri- P 314 torious task, namely, to level the ground, and to render it sufficiently secure for moral edifices of these majestic dimen- sions. For this ground has been honeycombed by subterranean workings which reason, in its confident but fruitless search for hidden treasures, has carried out in all directions, and which threaten the security of the superstructures. Our present duty is to obtain insight into the transcendental employment of pure reason, its principles and ideas, that we may be in a position to determine and estimate its influence and true value. Yet, before closing these introductory remarks, I beseech those who have the interests of philosophy at heart (which is more than is the case with most people) that, if they find themselves convinced by these and the following considera- tions, they be careful to preserve the expression 'idea' in its original meaning, that it may not become one of those expressions which are commonly used to indicate any and every species of representation, in a happy-go-lucky confu- sion, to the consequent detriment of science. There is no lack of terms suitable for each kind of representation, that we should thus needlessly encroach upon the province of any one of them. Their serial arrangement is as follows. The genus is representation in general (repraesentatio). Subordinate to it stands representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception which relates solely to the subject as the modifica- tion of its state is sensation (sensatio), an objective perception is knowledge (cognitio). This is either intuition or concept (intuitus vel conceptus). The former relates immediately to the object and is single, the latter refers to it immediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common. The concept is either an empirical or a pure concept. The pure con- cept, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone (not in the pure image of sensibility), is called a notion. A concept formed from notions and transcending the possibility of experience is an idea or concept of reason. Anyone who has familiarised himself with these distinctions must find it intolerable to hear the representation of the colour, red, called an idea. It ought not even to be called a concept of under- standing, a notion. P 315 FIRST BOOK OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC Section 2 THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS The Transcendental Analytic has shown us how the mere logical form of our knowledge may in itself contain original pure a priori concepts, which represent objects prior to all experience, or, speaking more correctly, indicate the synthetic unity which alone makes possible an empirical knowledge of objects. The form of judgments (converted into a concept of the synthesis of intuitions) yielded categories which direct all employment of understanding in experience. Similarly, we may presume that the form of syllogisms, when applied to the synthetic unity of intuitions under the direction of the categories, will contain the origin of special a priori concepts, which we may call pure concepts of reason, or transcendental ideas, and which will determine according to principles how understanding is to be employed in dealing with experience in its totality. The function of reason in its inferences consists in the universality of knowledge [which it yields] according to con- cepts, the syllogism being itself a judgment which is deter- mined a priori in the whole extent of its conditions. The pro- position, 'Caius is mortal', I could indeed derive from experi- ence by means of the understanding alone. But I am in pursuit of a concept (in this case, the concept 'man') that contains the condition under which the predicate (general term for what is asserted) of this judgment is given; and after I have sub- sumed the predicate under this condition taken in its whole extension ('All men are mortal'), I proceed, in accordance therewith, to determine the knowledge of my object ('Caius is mortal'). Accordingly, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a P 316 predicate to a certain object, after having first thought it in the major premiss in its whole extension under a given con- dition. This complete quantity of the extension in relation to such a condition is called universality (universalitas). In the synthesis of intuitions we have corresponding to this the allness (universitas) or totality of the conditions. The transcendental concept of reason is, therefore, none other than the concept of the totality of the conditions for any given conditioned. Now since it is the unconditioned alone which makes possible the totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of conditions is always itself unconditioned, a pure concept of reason can in general be explained by the concept of the unconditioned, conceived as containing a ground of the synthesis of the conditioned. The number of pure concepts of reason will be equal to the number of kinds of relation which the understanding repre- sents to itself by means of the categories. We have therefore to seek for an unconditioned, first, of the categorical synthesis in a subject; secondly, of the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series; thirdly, of the disjunctive synthesis of the parts in a system. There is thus precisely the same number of kinds of syl- logism, each of which advances through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned: first, to the subject which is never itself a pre- dicate; secondly, to the presupposition which itself presup- poses nothing further; thirdly, to such an aggregate of the members of the division of a concept as requires nothing further to complete the division. The pure concepts of reason -- of totality in the synthesis of conditions -- are thus at least necessary as setting us the task of extending the unity of understanding, where possible, up to the unconditioned, and are grounded in the nature of human reason. These tran- scendental concepts may, however, be without any suitable corresponding employment in concreto, and may therefore have no other utility than that of so directing the understand- ing that, while it is extended to the uttermost, it is also at the same time brought into complete consistency with itself. But while we are here speaking of the totality of con- ditions and of the unconditioned, as being equivalent titles for all concepts of reason, we again come upon an expression P 317 with which we cannot dispense, and which yet, owing to an ambiguity that attaches to it through long-standing misuse, we also cannot with safety employ. The word 'absolute' is one of the few words which in their original meaning were adapted to a concept that no other word in the same language exactly suits. Consequently its loss, or what amounts to the same thing, looseness in its employment, must carry with it the loss of the concept itself. And since, in this case, the con- cept is one to which reason devotes much of its attention, it cannot be relinquished without greatly harming all tran- scendental philosophy. The word 'absolute' is now often used merely to indicate that something is true of a thing considered in itself, and therefore of its inward nature. In this sense the absolutely possible would mean that which in itself (interne) is possible -- which is, in fact, the least that can be said of an object. On the other hand, the word is also sometimes used to indicate that something is valid in all respects, without limita- tion, e.g. absolute despotism, and in this sense the absolutely possible would mean what is in every relation (in all respects) possible -- which is the most that can be said of the possibility of a thing. Now frequently we find these two meanings com- bined. For example, what is internally impossible is impossible in any relation, and therefore absolutely impossible. But in most cases the two meanings are infinitely far apart, and I can in no wise conclude that because something is in itself possible, it is therefore also possible in every relation, and so absolutely possible. Indeed, as I shall subsequently show, absolute neces- sity is by no means always dependent on inner necessity, and must not, therefore, be treated as synonymous with it. If the opposite of something is internally impossible, this opposite is, of course, impossible in all respects, and the thing itself is therefore absolutely necessary. But I cannot reverse the reasoning so as to conclude that if something is absolutely necessary its opposite is internally impossible, i.e. that the absolute necessity of things is an inner necessity. For this inner necessity is in certain cases a quite empty expression to which we cannot attach any concept whatsoever, whereas the concept of the necessity of a thing in all relations (to every- thing possible) involves certain quite special determinations. P 318 Since the loss of a concept that is of great importance for speculative science can never be a matter of indifference to the philosopher, I trust that the fixing and careful preservation of the expression, on which the concept depends, will like- wise be not indifferent to him. It is, then, in this wider sense that I shall use the word 'absolute', opposing it to what is valid only comparatively, that is, in some particular respect. For while the latter is re- stricted by conditions, the former is valid without restriction. Now the transcendental concept of reason is directed always solely towards absolute totality in the synthesis of con- ditions, and never terminates save in what is absolutely, that is, in all relations, unconditioned. For pure reason leaves every- thing to the understanding -- the understanding [alone] apply- ing immediately to the objects of intuition, or rather to their synthesis in the imagination. Reason concerns itself exclusively with absolute totality in the employment of the concepts of the understanding, and endeavours to carry the synthetic unity. which is thought in the category, up to the completely uncon- ditioned. We may call this unity of appearances the unity of reason, and that expressed by the category the unity of under- standing. Reason accordingly occupies itself solely with the employment of understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter contains the ground of possible experience (for the concept of the absolute totality of conditions is not applicable in any experience, since no experience is unconditioned), but solely in order to prescribe to the understanding its direction to- wards a certain unity of which it has itself no concept, and in such manner as to unite all the acts of the understanding, in respect of every object, into an absolute whole. The object- ive employment of the pure concepts of reason is, therefore, always transcendent, while that of the pure concepts of under- standing must, in accordance with their nature, and inasmuch as their application is solely to possible experience, be always immanent. I understand by idea a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-ex- perience. Thus the pure concepts of reason, now under con- sideration, are transcendental ideas. They are concepts of pure P 319 reason, in that they view all knowledge gained in experience as being determined through an absolute totality of conditions. They are not arbitrarily invented; they are imposed by the very nature of reason itself, and therefore stand in necessary relation to the whole employment of understanding. Finally, they are transcendent and overstep the limits of all experi- ence; no object adequate to the transcendental idea can ever be found within experience. If I speak of an idea, then as regards its object, viewed as an object of pure understanding, I am saying a great deal, but as regards its relation to the subject, that is, in respect of its actuality under empirical conditions, I am for the same reason saying very little, in that, as being the concept of a maximum, it can never be correspondingly given in concreto. Since in the merely speculative employment of reason the latter [namely, to determine the actuality of the idea under empirical conditions] is indeed our whole purpose, and since the approximation to a concept, which yet is never actually reached, puts us in no better position than if the con- cept were entirely abortive, we say of such a concept -- it is only an idea. The absolute whole of all appearances -- we might thus say -- is only an idea; since we can never represent it in image, it remains a problem to which there is no solution. But since, on the other hand, in the practical employment of understand- ing, our sole concern is with the carrying out of rules, the idea of practical reason can always be given actually in concreto, although only in part; it is, indeed, the indispensable condition of all practical employment of reason. The practice of it is al- ways limited and defective, but is not confined within determin- able boundaries, and is therefore always under the influence of the concept of an absolute completeness. The practical idea is, therefore, always in the highest degree fruitful, and in its relation to our actual activities is indispensably necessary. Reason is here, indeed, exercising causality, as actually bringing about that which its concept contains; and of such wisdom we cannot, therefore, say disparagingly it is only an idea. On the contrary, just because it is the idea of the neces- sary unity of all possible ends, it must as an original, and at least restrictive condition, serve as standard in all that bears on the practical. Although we must say of the transcendental concepts of P 320 reason that they are only ideas, this is not by any means to be taken as signifying that they are superfluous and void. For even if they cannot determine any object, they may yet, in a fundamental and unobserved fashion, be of service to the understanding as a canon for its extended and consistent em- ployment. The understanding does not thereby obtain more knowledge of any object than it would have by means of its own concepts, but for the acquiring of such knowledge it receives better and more extensive guidance. Further -- what we need here no more than mention -- concepts of reason may perhaps make possible a transition from the concepts of nature to the practical concepts, and in that way may give support to the moral ideas themselves, bringing them into connection with the speculative knowledge of reason. As to all this, we must await explanation in the sequel. In accordance with our plan we leave aside the practical ideas, and consider reason only in its speculative, or rather, restricting ourselves still further, only in its transcendental employment. Here we must follow the path that we have taken in the deduction of the categories; we must consider the logical form of knowledge through reason, to see whether perhaps reason may not thereby be likewise a source of con- cepts which enable us to regard objects in themselves as deter- mined synthetically a priori, in relation to one or other of the functions of reason. Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of knowledge, is the faculty of inferring, i.e. judging medi- ately (by the subsumption of the condition of a possible judg- ment under the condition of a given judgment). The given judgment is the universal rule (major premiss). The subsump- tion of the condition of another possible judgment under the condition of the rule is the minor premiss. The actual judg- ment which applies the assertion of the rule to the subsumed case is the conclusion. The rule states something universally, subject to a certain condition. The condition of the rule is found to be fulfilled in an actual case. What has been asserted to be universally valid under that condition is therefore to be regarded as valid also in the actual case, which involves that condition. It is very evident, therefore, that reason arrives at P 321 knowledge by means of acts of the understanding which con- stitute a series of conditions. Thus if I arrive at the proposi- tion that all bodies are alterable, only by beginning with the more remote knowledge (in which the concept of body does not occur, but which nevertheless contains the condi- tion of that concept), namely, that everything composite is alterable; if I then proceed from this to a proposition which is less remote and stands under the condition of the last- named proposition, namely, that bodies are composite; and if from this I finally pass to a third proposition, which connects the more remote knowledge (alterable) with the knowledge actually before me, and so conclude that bodies are alter- able -- by this procedure I have arrived at knowledge (a con- clusion) by means of a series of conditions (the premisses). Now every series the exponent of which is given (in categori- cal or hypothetical judgment) can be continued; consequently this same activity of reason leads to ratiocinatio polysyllo- gistica, which is a series of inferences that can be prolonged indefinitely on the side either of the conditions (per prosyllo- gismos) or of the conditioned (per episyllogismos). But we soon become aware that the chain or series of pro- syllogisms, that is, of inferred knowledge on the side of the grounds or conditions of a given knowledge, in other words, of the ascending series of syllogisms, must stand in a different relation to the faculty of reason from that of the descending series, that is, of the advance of reason in the direction of the conditioned, by means of episyllogisms. For since in the former case the knowledge (conclusio) is given only as conditioned, we cannot arrive at it by means of reason otherwise than on the assumption that all the members of the series on the side of the conditions are given (totality in the series of the premisses); only on this assumption is the judgment before us possible a priori: whereas on the side of the conditioned, in respect of consequences, we only think a series in process of becoming, not one already presupposed or given in its completeness, and therefore an advance that is merely potential. If, therefore, knowledge be viewed as conditioned, reason is constrained to regard the series of conditions in the ascending line as com- pleted and as given in their totality. But if the same knowledge P 322 is viewed as a condition of yet other knowledge, and this know- ledge as constituting a series of consequences in a descend- ing line, reason can be quite indifferent as to how far this advance extends a parte posteriori, and whether a totality of the series is possible at all. For it does not need such a series in order to be able to draw its conclusion, this being already sufficiently determined and secured by its grounds a parte - priori. The series of premisses on the side of the conditions may have a first member, as its highest condition, or it may have no such member, in which case it is without limits a parte - priori. But however this may be, and even admitting that we can never succeed in comprehending a totality of conditions, the series must none the less contain such a totality; and the entire series must be unconditionally true if the conditioned, which is regarded as a consequence resulting from it, is to be counted as true. This is a requirement of reason, which an- nounces its knowledge as being determined a priori and as necessary, either in itself, in which case it needs no grounds, or, if it be derivative, as a member of a series of grounds, which itself, as a series, is unconditionally true. FIRST BOOK OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC Section 3 SYSTEM OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS We are not at present concerned with logical dialectic, which abstracts from all the content of knowledge and con- fines itself to exposing the fallacies concealed in the form of syllogisms, but with a transcendental dialectic which has to contain, completely a priori, the origin of certain modes of knowledge derived from pure reason as well as of certain inferred concepts, the object of which can never be given em- pirically and which therefore lie entirely outside [the sphere of ] the faculty of pure understanding. From the natural rela- tion which the transcendental employment of our knowledge, alike in inferences and in judgments, must bear to its logical P 323 employment, we have gathered that there can be only three kinds of dialectical inference, corresponding to the three kinds of inference through which reason can arrive at know- ledge by means of principles, and that in all of these its busi- ness is to ascend from the conditioned synthesis, to which understanding always remains restricted, to the unconditioned, which understanding can never reach. The relations which are to be universally found in all our representations are (1) relation to the subject; (2) relation to objects, either as appearances or as objects of thought in general. If we combine the subdivision with the main division, all relation of representations, of which we can form either a concept or an idea, is then threefold: (1) the relation to the subject; (2) the relation to the manifold of the object in the [field of] appearance; (3) the relation to all things in general. Now all pure concepts in general are concerned with the synthetic unity of representations, but [those of them which are] concepts of pure reason (transcendental ideas) are con- cerned with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions in general. All transcendental ideas can therefore be arranged in three classes, the first containing the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance, the third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general. The thinking subject is the object of psychology, the sum- total of all appearances (the world) is the object of cosmology, and the thing which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all that can be thought (the being of all beings) the object of theology. Pure reason thus furnishes the idea for a transcendental doctrine of the soul (psychologia ratio- nalis), for a transcendental science of the world (cosmologia rationalis), and, finally, for a transcendental knowledge of God (theologia transzendentalis). The understanding is not in a position to yield even the mere project of any one of these sciences, not even though it be supported by the highest logical employment of reason, that is, by all the conceiv- able inferences through which we seek to advance from one of its objects (appearance) to all others, up to the most remote P 324 members of the empirical synthesis; each of these sciences is an altogether pure and genuine product, or problem, of pure reason. In what precise modes the pure concepts of reason come under these three headings of all transcendental ideas will be fully explained in the next chapter. They follow the guiding- thread of the categories. For pure reason never relates directly to objects, but to the concepts which understanding frames in regard to objects. Similarly it is only by the process of completing our argument that it can be shown how reason, simply by the synthetic employment of that very function of which it makes use in categorical syllogisms, is necessarily brought to the concept of the absolute unity of the thinking subject, how the logical procedure used in hypothetical syllo- gisms leads to the ideal of the completely unconditioned in a series of given conditions, and finally how the mere form of the disjunctive syllogism must necessarily involve the highest concept of reason, that of a being of all beings -- a thought which, at first sight, seems utterly paradoxical. No objective deduction, such as we have been able to give of the categories, is, strictly speaking, possible in the case of these transcendental ideas. Just because they are only ideas they have, in fact, no relation to any object that could be given as coinciding with them. We can, indeed, undertake a sub- jective derivation of them from the nature of our reason; and this has been provided in the present chapter. As is easily seen, what pure reason alone has in view is the absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the con- ditions (whether of inherence, of dependence, or of concur- rence); it is not concerned with absolute completeness on the side of the conditioned. For the former alone is required in order to presuppose the whole series of the conditions, and to present it a priori to the understanding. Once we are given a complete (and unconditioned) condition, no concept of reason is required for the continuation of the series; for every step in the forward direction from the condition to the con- ditioned is carried through by the understanding itself. The P 325 transcendental ideas thus serve only for ascending, in the series of conditions, to the unconditioned, that is, to principles. As regards the descending to the conditioned, reason does, indeed, make a very extensive logical employment of the laws of understanding, but no kind of transcendental employ- ment; and if we form an idea of the absolute totality of such a synthesis (of the progressus), as, for instance, of the whole series of all future alterations in the world, this is a creation of the mind (ens rationis) which is only arbitrarily thought, and not a necessary presupposition of reason. For the possibility of the conditioned presupposes the totality of its conditions, but not of its consequences. Such a concept is not, therefore, one of the transcendental ideas; and it is with these alone that we have here to deal. Finally, we also discern that a certain connection and unity is evident among the transcendental ideas themselves, and that by means of them pure reason combines all its modes of knowledge into a system. The advance from the knowledge of oneself (the soul) to the knowledge of the world, and by means of this to the original being, is so natural that it seems to resemble the logical advance of reason from premisses to conclusion. ++ Metaphysics has as the proper ob- ject of its enquiries three ideas only: God, freedom, and immortality -- so related that the second concept, when combined with the first, should lead to the third as a necessary conclusion. Any other matters with which this science may deal serve merely as a means of arriving at these ideas and of establishing their reality. It does not need the ideas for the purposes of natural science, but in order to pass beyond nature. Insight into them would render theology and morals, and, through the union of these two, likewise religion, and therewith the highest ends of our existence, entirely and exclusively dependent on the faculty of speculative reason. In a systematic representation of the ideas, the order cited, the synthetic, would be the most suitable; but in the investigation which must necessarily precede it the analytic, or reverse order, is better adapted to the purpose of com- pleting our great project, as enabling us to start from what is im- mediately given us in experience -- advancing from the doctrine of the soul, to the doctrine of the world, and thence to the knowledge of God. P 325 Whether this is due to a concealed relationship of the same kind as subsists between the logical and the trans- cendental procedure, is one of the questions that await answer P 326 in the course of these enquiries. Indeed, we have already, in a preliminary manner, obtained an answer to the question, since in treating of the transcendental concepts of reason which, in philosophical theory, are commonly confused with others, and not properly distinguished even from concepts of understanding, we have been able to rescue them from their ambiguous position, to determine their origin, and at the same time, in so doing, to fix their precise number (to which we can never add), presenting them in a systematic connec- tion, and so marking out and enclosing a special field for pure reason. P 327 THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC BOOK II THE DIALECTICAL INFERENCES OF PURE REASON ALTHOUGH a purely transcendental idea is, in accordance with the original laws of reason, a quite necessary product of reason, its object, it may yet be said, is something of which we have no concept. For in respect of an object which is adequate to the demands of reason, it is not, in fact, possible that we should ever be able to form a concept of the under- standing, that is, a concept that allows of being exhibited and intuited in a possible experience. But we should be better advised and less likely to be misunderstood if we said that although we cannot have any knowledge of the object which corresponds to an idea, we yet have a problematic concept of it. The transcendental (subjective) reality of the pure concepts of reason depends on our having been led to such ideas by a necessary syllogism. There will therefore be syllogisms which contain no empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know to something else of which we have no concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable illusion, we yet ascribe objective reality. These conclusions are, then, rather to be called pseudo-rational than rational, although in view of their origin they may well lay claim to the latter title, since they are not fictitious and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very nature of reason. They are sophistications not of men but of pure reason itself. Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them. After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against P 328 actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. There are, then, only three kinds of dialectical syllogisms -- just so many as there are ideas in which their conclusions result. In the first kind of syllogism I conclude from the transcendental concept of the subject, which contains nothing manifold, the absolute unity of this subject itself, of which, however, even in so doing, I possess no concept whatsoever. This dialectical inference I shall entitle the transcendental paralogism. The second kind of pseudo-rational inference is directed to the transcendental concept of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for any given appearance. From the fact that my concept of the unconditioned synthetic unity of the series, as thought in a certain way, is always self-contradictory, I conclude that there is really a unity of the opposite kind, although of it also I have no concept. The position of reason in these dialectical inferences I shall entitle the antinomy of pure reason. Finally, in the third kind of pseudo-rational inference, from the totality of the conditions under which objects in general, in so far as they can be given me, have to be thought, I conclude to the absolute synthetic unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general, i.e. from things which I do not know through the merely transcendental concept of them I infer an ens entium, which I know even less through any transcendental concept, and of the unconditioned necessity of which I can form no concept whatsoever. This dialectical syllogism I shall entitle the ideal of pure reason. SECOND BOOK OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC CHAPTER I THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON A logical paralogism is a syllogism which is fallacious in form, be its content what it may. A transcendental paralogism is one in which there is a transcendental ground, constraining us to draw a formally invalid conclusion. Such a fallacy is P 329 therefore grounded in the nature of human reason, and gives rise to an illusion which cannot be avoided, although it may, indeed, be rendered harmless. We now come to a concept which was not included in the general list of transcendental concepts but which must yet be counted as belonging to that list, without, however, in the least altering it or declaring it defective. This is the concept or, if the term be preferred, the judgment, 'I think'. As is easily seen, this is the vehicle of all concepts, and therefore also of tran- scendental concepts, and so is always included in the conceiv- ing of these latter, and is itself transcendental. But it can have no special designation, because it serves only to introduce all our thought, as belonging to consciousness. Meanwhile, however free it be of empirical admixture (impressions of the senses), it yet enables us to distinguish, through the nature of our faculty of representation, two kinds of objects. 'I', as think- ing, am an object of inner sense, and am called 'soul'. That which is an object of the outer senses is called 'body'. Accord- ingly the expression 'I', as a thinking being, signifies the object of that psychology which may be entitled the 'rational doctrine of the soul', inasmuch as I am not here seeking to learn in regard to the soul anything more than can be in- ferred, independently of all experience (which determines me more specifically and in concreto), from this concept 'I', so far as it is present in all thought. The rational doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking of this kind; for if in this science the least empirical element of my thought, or any special perception of my inner state, were intermingled with the grounds of knowledge, it would no longer be a rational but an empirical doctrine of the soul. Thus we have here what professes to be a science built upon the single proposition 'I think'. Whether this claim be well or ill grounded, we may, very fittingly, in accordance with the nature of a transcendental philosophy, proceed to investi- gate. The reader must not object that this proposition, which expresses the perception of the self, contains an inner experi- ence, and that the rational doctrine of the soul founded upon it is never pure and is therefore to that extent based upon an empirical principle. For this inner perception is nothing more than the mere apperception 'I think', by which even tran- P 330 scendental concepts are made possible; what we assert in them is 'I think substance, cause', etc. For inner experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general and its relation to other perception, in which no special distinction or empirical determination is given, is not to be regarded as empirical knowledge but as knowledge of the empirical in general, and has to be reckoned with the investigation of the possibility of any and every experience, which is certainly a transcendental enquiry. The least object of perception (for ex- ample, even pleasure or displeasure), if added to the universal representation of self-consciousness, would at once transform rational psychology into empirical psychology. 'I think' is, therefore, the sole text of rational psychology, and from it the whole of its teaching has to be developed. Obviously, if this thought is to be related to an object (myself), it can contain none but transcendental predicates of that ob- ject, since the least empirical predicate would destroy the rational purity of the science and its independence of all experience. All that is here required is that we follow the guidance of the categories, with this difference only, that since our starting- point is a given thing, 'I' as thinking being, we begin with the category of substance, whereby a thing in itself is represented, and so proceed backwards through the series, without, how- ever, otherwise changing the order adopted in the table of the categories. The topic of the rational doctrine of the soul, from which everything else that it contains must be derived, is accordingly as follows: I The soul is substance. 2 As regards its quality it is simple. 3 As regards the different times in which it exists, it is numerically identical, that is, unity (not plurality). P 331 4 It is in relation to possible objects in space. All the concepts of pure psychology arise from these ele- ments, simply by way of combination, without admission of any other principle. This substance, merely as object of inner sense, gives the concept of immateriality; as simple substance, that of incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, personality; all these three together, spirituality; while the relation to objects in space gives commercium with bodies, and so leads us to represent the thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as soul (anima), and as the ground of animality. This last, in turn, as limited by spiritu- ality, gives the concept of immortality. In connection with these concepts we have four paralogisms of a transcendental psychology -- which is wrongly regarded as a science of pure reason -- concerning the nature of our thinking being. We can assign no other basis for this teaching than the simple, and in itself completely empty, representation 'I'; and we cannot even say that this is a concept, but only that it is a bare consciousness which accompanies all concepts. Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is repre- sented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X. It is known only through the thoughts which are its predicates, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any concept what- soever, but can only revolve in a perpetual circle, since any judgment upon it has always already made use of its repre- sentation. ++ The reader who has difficulty in guessing the psychological meaning of these expressions taken in their transcendental abstract- ness, and in discovering why the last-mentioned attribute of the soul belongs to the category of existence, will find the terms sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. Further, I have to apologise for the Latin expressions which, contrary to good taste, have usurped the place of their German equivalents, both in this section and in the work as a whole. My excuse is that I have preferred to lose somewhat in elegance of language rather than to increase, in however minor a degree, the reader's difficulties. P 331 And the reason why this inconvenience is insepar- ably bound up with it, is that consciousness in itself is not a representation distinguishing a particular object, but a form P 332 of representation in general, that is, of representation in so far as it is to be entitled knowledge; for it is only of knowledge that I can say that I am thereby thinking something. It must, on first thoughts, seem strange that the condition under which alone I think, and which is therefore merely a pro- perty of myself as subject, should likewise be valid for every- thing that thinks, and that on a seemingly empirical proposition we can presume to base an apodeictic and universal judgment, namely, that that which thinks must, in all cases, be constituted as the voice of self-consciousness declares it to be constituted in my own self. The reason is this: we must assign to things, necessarily and a priori, all the properties that constitute the conditions under which alone we think them. Now I cannot have any representation whatsoever of a thinking being, through any outer experience, but only through self-conscious- ness. Objects of this kind are, therefore, nothing more than the transference of this consciousness of mine to other things, which in this way alone can be represented as thinking beings. The proposition, 'I think', is, however, here taken only prob- lematically, not in so far as it may contain perception of an existent (the Cartesian cogito, ergo sum), but in respect of its mere possibility, in order to see what properties applicable to its subject (be that subject actually existent or not) may follow from so simple a proposition. If our knowledge of thinking beings in general, by means of pure reason, were based on more than the cogito, if we likewise made use of observations concerning the play of our thoughts and the natural laws of the thinking self to be de- rived from these thoughts, there would arise an empirical psy- chology, which would be a kind of physiology of inner sense, capable perhaps of explaining the appearances of inner sense, but never of revealing such properties as do not in any way belong to possible experience (e.g. the properties of the simple), nor of yielding any apodeictic knowledge regarding the nature of thinking beings in general. It would not, therefore, be a rational psychology. Since the proposition 'I think' (taken problematically) con- tains the form of each and every judgment of the understand- ing and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is evi- dent that the inferences from it admit only of a transcendental P 333 employment of the understanding. And since this employment excludes any admixture of experience, we cannot, after what has been shown above, entertain any favourable anticipations in regard to its methods of procedure. We therefore propose to follow it, with a critical eye, through all the predicaments of pure psychology. THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON FIRST PARALOGISM: OF SUBSTANTIALITY That, the representation of which is the absolute subject of our judgments and cannot therefore be employed as deter- mination of another thing, is substance. I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judgments, and this representation of myself cannot be employed as predicate of any other thing. Therefore I, as thinking being (soul), am substance. Critique of the First Paralogism of Pure Psychology In the analytical part of the Transcendental Logic we have shown that pure categories, and among them that of sub- stance, have in themselves no objective meaning, save in so far as they rest upon an intuition, and are applied to the manifold of this intuition, as functions of synthetic unity. In the ab- sence of this manifold, they are merely functions of a judg- ment, without content. I can say of any and every thing that it is substance, in the sense that I distinguish it from mere predicates and determinations of things. Now in all our thought the 'I' is the subject, in which thoughts inhere only as determinations; and this 'I' cannot be employed as the determination of another thing. Everyone must, therefore, necessarily regard himself as substance, and thought as [con- sisting] only [in] accidents of his being, determinations of his state. But what use am I to make of this concept of a substance? That I, as a thinking being, persist for myself, and do not in any natural manner either arise or perish, can by no means be P 334 deduced from it. Yet there is no other use to which I can put the concept of the substantiality of my thinking subject, and apart from such use I could very well dispense with it. So far from being able to deduce these properties merely from the pure category of substance, we must, on the contrary, take our start from the permanence of an object given in ex- perience as permanent. For only to such an object can the concept of substance be applied in a manner that is empiric- ally serviceable. In the above proposition, however, we have not taken as our basis any experience; the inference is merely from the concept of the relation which all thought has to the 'I' as the common subject in which it inheres. Nor should we, in resting it upon experience, be able, by any sure observation, to demonstrate such permanence. The 'I' is indeed in all thoughts, but there is not in this representation the least trace of intui- tion, distinguishing the 'I' from other objects of intuition. Thus we can indeed perceive that this representation is invari- ably present in all thought, but not that it is an abiding and continuing intuition, wherein the thoughts, as being transitory, give place to one another. It follows, therefore, that the first syllogism of tran- scendental psychology, when it puts forward the constant logi- cal subject of thought as being knowledge of the real subject in which the thought inheres, is palming off upon us what is a mere pretence of new insight. We do not have, and cannot have, any knowledge whatsoever of any such subject. Con- sciousness is, indeed, that which alone makes all representa- tions to be thoughts, and in it, therefore, as the transcendental subject, all our perceptions must be found; but beyond this logical meaning of the 'I', we have no knowledge of the sub- ject in itself, which as substratum underlies this 'I', as it does all thoughts. The proposition, 'The soul is substance', may, however, quite well be allowed to stand, if only it be recog- nised that this concept [of the soul as substance] does not carry us a single step further, and so cannot yield us any of the usual deductions of the pseudo-rational doctrine of the soul, as, for instance, the everlasting duration of the human soul in all changes and even in death -- if, that is to say, we recognise that this concept signifies a substance only in idea, not in reality. P 335 SECOND PARALOGISM: OF SIMPLICITY That, the action of which can never be regarded as the concurrence of several things acting, is simple. Now the soul, or the thinking 'I', is such a being. There- fore, etc. Critique of the Second Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology This is the Achilles of all dialectical inferences in the pure doctrine of the soul. It is no mere sophistical play, contrived by a dogmatist in order to impart to his assertions a super- ficial plausibility, but an inference which appears to with- stand even the keenest scrutiny and the most scrupulously exact investigation. It is as follows. Every composite substance is an aggregate of several sub- stances, and the action of a composite, or whatever inheres in it as thus composite, is an aggregate of several actions or acci- dents, distributed among the plurality of the substances. Now an effect which arises from the concurrence of many acting substances is indeed possible, namely, when this effect is external only (as, for instance, the motion of a body is the combined motion of all its parts). But with thoughts, as in- ternal accidents belonging to a thinking being, it is different. For suppose it be the composite that thinks: then every part of it would be a part of the thought, and only all of them taken together would contain the whole thought. But this cannot con- sistently be maintained. For representations (for instance, the single words of a verse), distributed among different beings, never make up a whole thought (a verse), and it is therefore impossible that a thought should inhere in what is essentially composite. It is therefore possible only in a single substance, which, not being an aggregate of many, is absolutely simple. ++ This proof can very easily be given the customary syllogistic correctness of form. But for my purpose it is sufficient to have made clear, though in popular fashion, the bare ground of proof. P 335 The so-called nervus probandi of this argument lies in the proposition, that if a multiplicity of representations are to form a single representation, they must be contained in the P 336 absolute unity of the thinking subject. No one, however, can prove this proposition from concepts. For how should he set about the task of achiev- ing this? The proposition, 'A thought can only be the effect of the absolute unity of the thinking being', cannot be treated as analytic. For the unity of the thought, which consists of many representations, is collective, and as far as mere con- cepts can show, may relate just as well to the collective unity of different substances acting together (as the motion of a body is the composite motion of all its parts) as to the absolute unity of the subject. Consequently, the necessity of presuppos- ing, in the case of a composite thought, a simple substance, cannot be demonstrated in accordance with the principle of identity. Nor will anyone venture to assert that the proposi- tion allows of being known synthetically and completely a priori from mere concepts -- not, at least, if he understands the ground of the possibility of a priori synthetic propositions, as above explained. It is likewise impossible to derive this necessary unity of the subject, as a condition of the possibility of every thought, from experience. For experience yields us no knowledge of necessity, apart even from the fact that the concept of absolute unity is quite outside its province. Whence then are we to derive this proposition upon which the whole psychological syllogism depends? It is obvious that, if I wish to represent to myself a think- ing being, I must put myself in his place, and thus substitute, as it were, my own subject for the object I am seeking to consider (which does not occur in any other kind of investiga- tion), and that we demand the absolute unity of the subject of a thought, only because otherwise we could not say, 'I think' (the manifold in a representation). For although the whole of the thought could be divided and distributed among many subjects, the subjective 'I' can never be thus divided and distributed, and it is this 'I' that we presuppose in all thinking. Here again, as in the former paralogism, the formal pro- position of apperception, 'I think', remains the sole ground to which rational psychology can appeal when it thus ventures upon an extension of its knowledge. This proposition, how- ever, is not itself an experience, but the form of apperception, P 337 which belongs to and precedes every experience; and as such it must always be taken only in relation to some possible knowledge, as a merely subjective condition of that know- ledge. We have no right to transform it into a condition of the possibility of a knowledge of objects, that is, into a concept of thinking being in general. For we are not in a position to re- present such being to ourselves save by putting ourselves, with the formula of our consciousness, in the place of every other intelligent being. Nor is the simplicity of myself (as soul) really inferred from the proposition, 'I think'; it is already involved in every thought. The proposition, 'I am simple', must be regarded as an immediate expression of apperception, just as what is referred to as the Cartesian inference, cogito, ergo sum, is really a tautology, since the cogito (sum cogitans) asserts my existence immediately. 'I am simple' means nothing more than that this representation, 'I', does not contain in itself the least manifoldness and that it is absolute (although merely logical) unity. Thus the renowned psychological proof is founded merely on the indivisible unity of a representation, which governs only the verb in its relation to a person. It is obvious that in attaching 'I' to our thoughts we designate the subject of in- herence only transcendentally, without noting in it any quality whatsoever -- in fact, without knowing anything of it either by direct acquaintance or otherwise. It means a something in general (transcendental subject), the representation of which must, no doubt, be simple, if only for the reason that there is nothing determinate in it. Nothing, indeed, can be represented that is simpler than that which is represented through the concept of a mere something. But the simplicity of the repre- sentation of a subject is not eo ipso knowledge of the simplicity of the subject itself, for we abstract altogether from its pro- perties when we designate it solely by the entirely empty expression 'I', an expression which I can apply to every thinking subject. This much, then, is certain, that through the 'I', I always P 338 entertain the thought of an absolute, but logical, unity of the subject (simplicity). It does not, however, follow that I thereby know the actual simplicity of my subject. The proposition, 'I am substance', signifies, as we have found, nothing but the pure category, of which I can make no use (empirically) in concreto; and I may therefore legitimately say: 'I am a simple substance', that is, a substance the representation of which never contains a synthesis of the manifold. But this concept, as also the proposition, tells us nothing whatsoever in regard to my- self as an object of experience, since the concept of substance is itself used only as a function of synthesis, without any under- lying intuition, and therefore without an object. It concerns only the condition of our knowledge; it does not apply to any assignable object. We will test the supposed usefulness of the proposition by an experiment. Everyone must admit that the assertion of the simple nature of the soul is of value only in so far as I can thereby dis- tinguish this subject from all matter, and so can exempt it from the dissolution to which matter is always liable. This is indeed, strictly speaking, the only use for which the above proposition is intended, and is therefore generally expressed as 'The soul is not corporeal'. If, then, I can show that, although we allow full objective validity -- the validity ap- propriate to a judgment of pure reason derived solely from pure categories -- to this cardinal proposition of the rational doctrine of the soul (that is, that everything which thinks is a simple substance), we still cannot make the least use of this proposition in regard to the question of its dissimilarity from or relation to matter, this will be the same as if I had relegated this supposed psychological insight to the field of mere ideas, without any real objective use. In the Transcendental Aesthetic we have proved, beyond all question, that bodies are mere appearances of our outer sense and not things in themselves. We are therefore justified in saying that our thinking subject is not corporeal; in other words, that, inasmuch as it is represented by us as object of inner sense, it cannot, in so far as it thinks, be an object of outer sense, that is, an appearance in space. This is equivalent to saying that thinking beings, as such, can never be found by us among outer appearances, and that their thoughts, con- P 339 sciousness, desires, etc. , cannot be outwardly intuited. All these belong to inner sense. This argument does, in fact, seem to be so natural and so popular that even the commonest under- standing appears to have always relied upon it, and thus al- ready, from the earliest times, to have regarded souls as quite different entities from their bodies. But although extension, impenetrability, cohesion, and motion -- in short, everything which outer senses can give us -- neither are nor contain thoughts, feeling, desire, or resolu- tion, these never being objects of outer intuition, nevertheless the something which underlies the outer appearances and which so affects our sense that it obtains the representations of space, matter, shape, etc. , may yet, when viewed as nou- menon (or better, as transcendental object), be at the same time the subject of our thoughts. That the mode in which our outer sense is thereby affected gives us no intuition of re- presentations, will, etc. , but only of space and its determina- tions, proves nothing to the contrary. For this something is not extended, nor is it impenetrable or composite, since all these predicates concern only sensibility and its intuition, in so far as we are affected by certain (to us otherwise unknown) objects. By such statements we are not, however, enabled to know what kind of an object it is, but only to recognise that if it be considered in itself, and therefore apart from any relation to the outer senses, these predicates of outer appear- ances cannot be assigned to it. On the other hand, the predi- cates of inner sense, representations and thought, are not inconsistent with its nature. Accordingly, even granting the human soul to be simple in nature, such simplicity by no means suffices to distinguish it from matter, in respect of the substratum of the latter -- if, that is to say, we consider matter, as indeed we ought to, as mere appearance. If matter were a thing in itself, it would, as a composite being, be entirely different from the soul, as a simple being. But matter is mere outer appearance, the substratum of which can- not be known through any predicate that we can assign to it. I can therefore very well admit the possibility that it is in itself simple, although owing to the manner in which it affects our senses it produces in us the intuition of the extended and so of P 340 the composite. I may further assume that the substance which in relation to our outer sense possesses extension is in itself the possessor of thoughts, and that these thoughts can by means of its own inner sense be consciously represented. In this way, what in one relation is entitled corporeal would in another relation be at the same time a thinking being, whose thoughts we cannot intuit, though we can indeed intuit their signs in the [field of] appearance. Accordingly, the thesis that only souls (as particular kinds of substances) think, would have to be given up; and we should have to fall back on the common expression that men think, that is, that the very same being which, as outer appearance, is extended, is (in itself) internally a subject, and is not composite, but is simple and thinks. But, without committing ourselves in regard to such hypo- theses, we can make this general remark. If I understand by soul a thinking being in itself, the question whether or not it is the same in kind as matter -- matter not being a thing in itself, but merely a species of representations in us -- is by its very terms illegitimate. For it is obvious that a thing in itself is of a different nature from the determinations which constitute only its state. If, on the other hand, we compare the thinking 'I' not with matter but with the intelligible that lies at the basis of the outer appearance which we call matter, we have no knowledge whatsoever of the intelligible, and therefore are in no position to say that the soul is in any inward respect different from it. The simple consciousness is not, therefore, knowledge of the simple nature of the self as subject, such as might enable us to distinguish it from matter, as from a composite being. If, therefore, in the only case in which this concept can be of service, namely, in the comparison of myself with objects of outer experience, it does not suffice for determining what is specific and distinctive in the nature of the self, then though we may still profess to know that the thinking 'I', the soul (a name for the transcendental object of inner sense), is simple, such a way of speaking has no sort of application to real ob- jects, and therefore cannot in the least extend our knowledge. P 341 Thus the whole of rational psychology is involved in the collapse of its main support. Here as little as elsewhere can we hope to extend our knowledge through mere concepts -- still less by means of the merely subjective form of all our concepts, consciousness -- in the absence of any relation to possible ex- perience. For [as we have thus found], even the fundamental concept of a simple nature is such that it can never be met with in any experience, and such, therefore, that there is no way of attaining to it, as an objectively valid concept. THIRD PARALOGISM: OF PERSONALITY That which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different times is in so far a person. Now the soul is conscious, etc. Therefore it is a person. Critique of the Third Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology If I want to know through experience, the numerical iden- tity of an external object, I shall pay heed to that permanent element in the appearance to which as subject everything else is related as determination, and note its identity throughout the time in which the determinations change. Now I am an object of inner sense, and all time is merely the form of inner sense. Consequently, I refer each and all of my successive determina- tions to the numerically identical self, and do so throughout time, that is, in the form of the inner intuition of myself. This being so, the personality of the soul has to be regarded not as inferred but as a completely identical proposition of self-con- sciousness in time; and this, indeed, is why it is valid a priori. For it really says nothing more than that in the whole time in which I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of myself; and it comes to the same whether I say that this whole time is in me, as individual unity, or that I am to be found as numerically identical in all this time. In my own consciousness, therefore, identity of person is unfailingly met with. But if I view myself from the standpoint of another person (as object of his outer intuition), it is this P 342 outer observer who first represents me in time, for in the apper- ception time is represented, strictly speaking, only in me. Al- though he admits, therefore, the 'I', which accompanies, and indeed with complete identity, all representations at all times in my consciousness, he will draw no inference from this to the objective permanence of myself. For just as the time in which the observer sets me is not the time of my own but of his sensi- bility, so the identity which is necessarily bound up with my consciousness is not therefore bound up with his, that is, with the consciousness which contains the outer intuition of my subject. The identity of the consciousness of myself at different times is therefore only a formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence, and in no way proves the numerical identity of my subject. Despite the logical identity of the 'I', such a change may have occurred in it as does not allow of the retention of its identity, and yet we may ascribe to it the same-sounding 'I', which in every different state, even in one involving change of the [thinking] subject, might still retain the thought of the preceding subject and so hand it over to the subsequent subject. Although the dictum of certain ancient schools, that every- thing in the world is in a flux and nothing is permanent and abiding, cannot be reconciled with the admission of sub- stances, it is not refuted by the unity of self-consciousness. ++ An elastic ball which impinges on another similar ball in a straight line communicates to the latter its whole motion, and there- fore its whole state (that is, if we take account only of the positions in space). If, then, in analogy with such bodies, we postulate sub- stances such that the one communicates to the other representations together with the consciousness of them, we can conceive a whole series of substances of which the first transmits its state together with its consciousness to the second, the second its own state with that of the preceding substance to the third, and this in turn the states of all the preceding substances together with its own conscious- ness and with their consciousness to another. The last substance would then be conscious of all the states of the previously changed substances, as being its own states, because they would have been transferred to it together with the consciousness of them. And yet it would not have been one and the same person in all these states. P 343 For we are unable from our own consciousness to determine whether, as souls, we are permanent or not. Since we reckon as belonging to our identical self only that of which we are conscious, we must necessarily judge that we are one and the same throughout the whole time of which we are conscious. We cannot, however, claim that this judgment would be valid from the standpoint of an outside observer. For since the only permanent appearance which we encounter in the soul is the representation 'I' that accompanies and connects them all, we are unable to prove that this 'I', a mere thought, may not be in the same state of flux as the other thoughts which, by means of it, are linked up with one another. It is indeed strange that personality, and its presupposi- tion, permanence, and therefore the substantiality of the soul, should have to be proved at this stage and not earlier. For could we have presupposed these latter [permanence and sub- stantiality], there would follow, not indeed the continuance of consciousness, yet at least the possibility of a continuing con- sciousness in an abiding subject, and that is already sufficient for personality. For personality does not itself at once cease because its activity is for a time interrupted. This permanence, however, is in no way given prior to that numerical identity of our self which we infer from identical apperception, but on the contrary is inferred first from the numerical identity. (If the argument proceeded aright, the concept of substance, which is applicable only empirically, would first be brought in after such proof of numerical identity. ) Now, since this identity of person [presupposing, as it does, numerical iden- tity] in nowise follows from the identity of the 'I' in the con- sciousness of all the time in which I know myself, we could not, earlier in the argument, have founded upon it the sub- stantiality of the soul. Meanwhile we may still retain the concept of personality just as we have retained the concept of substance and of the simple -- in so far as it is merely transcendental, that is, con- cerns the unity of the subject, otherwise unknown to us, in the determinations of which there is a thoroughgoing connection through apperception. Taken in this way, the con- cept is necessary for practical employment and is sufficient for P 344 such use; but we can never parade it as an extension of our self-knowledge through pure reason, and as exhibiting to us from the mere concept of the identical self an unbroken con- tinuance of the subject. For this concept revolves perpetually in a circle, and does not help us in respect to any question which aims at synthetic knowledge. What matter may be as a thing in itself (transcendental object) is completely unknown to us, though, owing to its being represented as something ex- ternal, its permanence as appearance can indeed be observed. But if I want to observe the mere 'I' in the change of all repre- sentations, I have no other correlatum to use in my comparisons except again myself, with the universal conditions of my con- sciousness. Consequently, I can give none but tautological answers to all questions, in that I substitute my concept and its unity for the properties which belong to myself as object, and so take for granted that which the questioner has desired to know. THE FOURTH PARALOGISM: OF IDEALITY (IN REGARD TO OUTER RELATION) That, the existence of which can only be inferred as a cause of given perceptions, has a merely doubtful existence. Now all outer appearances are of such a nature that their existence is not immediately perceived, and that we can only infer them as the cause of given perceptions. Therefore the existence of all objects of the outer senses is doubtful. This uncertainty I entitle the ideality of outer appear- ances, and the doctrine of this ideality is called idealism, as distinguished from the counter-assertion of a possible certainty in regard to objects of outer sense, which is called dualism. Critique of the Fourth Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology Let us first examine the premisses. We are justified, [it is argued], in maintaining that only what is in ourselves can be perceived immediately, and that my own existence is the sole object of a mere perception. The existence, therefore, of an actual object outside me (if this word 'me' be taken in the P 345 intellectual [not in the empirical] sense) is never given directly in perception. Perception is a modification of inner sense, and the existence of the outer object can be added to it only in thought, as being its outer cause, and accordingly as being inferred. For the same reason, Descartes was justified in limiting all perception, in the narrowest sense of that term, to the proposition, 'I, as a thinking being, exist. ' Obviously, since what is without is not in me, I cannot encounter it in my apperception, nor therefore in any perception, which, properly regarded, is merely the determination of apperception. I am not, therefore, in a position to perceive external things, but can only infer their existence from my inner perception, taking the inner perception as the effect of which something external is the proximate cause. Now the inference from a given effect to a determinate cause is always uncertain, since the effect may be due to more than one cause. Accordingly, as regards the relation of the perception to its cause, it always remains doubtful whether the cause be internal or external; whether, that is to say, all the so-called outer perceptions are not a mere play of our inner sense, or whether they stand in relation to actual external objects as their cause. At all events, the existence of the latter is only inferred, and is open to all the dangers of inference, whereas the object of inner sense (I myself with all my representations) is immediately perceived, and its existence does not allow of being doubted. The term 'idealist' is not, therefore, to be understood as applying to those who deny the existence of external objects of the senses, but only to those who do not admit that their existence is known through immediate perception, and who therefore conclude that we can never, by way of any possible experience, be completely certain as to their reality. Before exhibiting our paralogism in all its deceptive illusoriness, I have first to remark that we must necessarily distinguish two types of idealism, the transcendental and the empirical. By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor con- ditions of objects viewed as things in themselves. To this ideal- P 346 ism there is opposed a transcendental realism which regards time and space as something given in themselves, independ- ently of our sensibility. The transcendental realist thus inter- prets outer appearances (their reality being taken as granted) as things-in-themselves, which exist independently of us and of our sensibility, and which are therefore outside us -- the phrase 'outside us' being interpreted in conformity with pure con- cepts of understanding. It is, in fact, this transcendental realist who afterwards plays the part of empirical idealist. After wrongly supposing that objects of the senses, if they are to be external, must have an existence by themselves, and inde- pendently of the senses, he finds that, judged from this point of view, all our sensuous representations are inadequate to establish their reality. The transcendental idealist, on the other hand, may be an empirical realist or, as he is called, a dualist; that is, he may admit the existence of matter without going outside his mere self-consciousness, or assuming anything more than the cer- tainty of his representations, that is, the cogito, ergo sum. For he considers this matter and even its inner possibility to be appearance merely; and appearance, if separated from our sensibility, is nothing. Matter is with him, therefore, only a species of representations (intuition), which are called external, not as standing in relation to objects in themselves external, but because they relate perceptions to the space in which all things are external to one another, while yet the space itself is in us. From the start, we have declared ourselves in favour of this transcendental idealism; and our doctrine thus removes all difficulty in the way of accepting the existence of matter on the unaided testimony of our mere self-consciousness, or of declaring it to be thereby proved in the same manner as the existence of myself as a thinking being is proved. There can be no question that I am conscious of my representations; these representations and I myself, who have the representa- tions, therefore exist. External objects (bodies), however, are mere appearances, and are therefore nothing but a species of my representations, the objects of which are something only through these representations. Apart from them they are nothing. Thus external things exist as well as I myself, and P 347 both indeed, upon the immediate witness of my self-conscious- ness. The only difference is that the representation of myself, as the thinking subject, belongs to inner sense only, while the representations which mark extended beings belong also to outer sense. In order to arrive at the reality of outer objects I have just as little need to resort to inference as I have in re- gard to the reality of the object of my inner sense, that is, in regard to the reality of my thoughts. For in both cases alike the objects are nothing but representations, the immediate per- ception (consciousness) of which is at the same time a suffi- cient proof of their reality. The transcendental idealist is, therefore, an empirical real- ist, and allows to matter, as appearance, a reality which does not permit of being inferred, but is immediately perceived. Transcendental realism, on the other hand, inevitably falls into difficulties, and finds itself obliged to give way to em- pirical idealism, in that it regards the objects of outer sense as something distinct from the senses themselves, treating mere appearances as self-subsistent beings, existing outside us. On such a view as this, however clearly we may be conscious of our representation of these things, it is still far from certain that, if the representation exists, there exists also the object corresponding to it. In our system, on the other hand, these external things, namely matter, are in all their configurations and alterations nothing but mere appearances, that is, repre- sentations in us, of the reality of which we are immediately conscious. Since, so far as I know, all psychologists who adopt em- pirical idealism are transcendental realists, they have cer- tainly proceeded quite consistently in ascribing great import- ance to empirical idealism, as one of the problems in regard to which the human mind is quite at a loss how to proceed. For if we regard outer appearances as representations produced in us by their objects, and if these objects be things existing in themselves outside us, it is indeed impossible to see how we can come to know the existence of the objects otherwise than by in- ference from the effect to the cause; and this being so, it must always remain doubtful whether the cause in question be in us or outside us. We can indeed admit that something, which P 348 may be (in the transcendental sense) outside us, is the cause of our outer intuitions, but this is not the object of which we are thinking in the representations of matter and of corporeal things; for these are merely appearances, that is, mere kinds of representation, which are never to be met with save in us, and the reality of which depends on immediate consciousness, just as does the consciousness of my own thoughts. The transcend- ental object is equally unknown in respect to inner and to outer intuition. But it is not of this that we are here speaking, but of the empirical object, which is called an external object if it is represented in space, and an inner object if it is repre- sented only in its time-relations. Neither space nor time, how- ever, is to be found save in us. The expression 'outside us' is thus unavoidably ambiguous in meaning, sometimes signifying what as thing in itself exists apart from us, and sometimes what belongs solely to outer appearance. In order, therefore, to make this concept, in the latter sense -- the sense in which the psychological question as to the reality of our outer intuition has to be understood -- quite unambiguous, we shall distinguish empirically external objects from those which may be said to be external in the transcendental sense, by explicitly entitling the former 'things which are to be found in space'. Space and time are indeed a priori representations, which dwell in us as forms of our sensible intuition, before any real object, determining our sense through sensation, has enabled us to represent the object under those sensible relations. But the material or real element, the something which is to be intuited in space, necessarily presupposes perception. Per- ception exhibits the reality of something in space; and in the absence of perception no power of imagination can invent and produce that something. It is sensation, therefore, that indicates a reality in space or in time, according as it is related to the one or to the other mode of sensible intuition. (Once sensation is given -- if referred to an object in general, though not as deter- mining that object, it is entitled perception -- thanks to its mani- foldness we can picture in imagination many objects which have no empirical place in space or time outside the imagination. ) P 349 This admits of no doubt; whether we take pleasure and pain, or the sensations of the outer senses, colours, heat, etc. , per- ception is that whereby the material required to enable us to think objects of sensible intuition must first be given. This perception, therefore (to consider, for the moment, only outer intuitions), represents something real in space. For, in the first place, while space is the representation of a mere possibility of coexistence, perception is the representation of a reality. Secondly, this reality is represented in outer sense, that is, in space. Thirdly, space is itself nothing but mere representation, and therefore nothing in it can count as real save only what is represented in it; and conversely, what is given in it, that is, represented through perception, is also real in it. For if it were not real, that is, immediately given through empirical intuition, it could not be pictured in imagination, since what is real in intuitions cannot be invented a priori. All outer perception, therefore, yields immediate proof of something real in space, or rather is the real itself. In this sense empirical realism is beyond question; that is, there corresponds to our outer intuitions something real in space. Space itself, with all its appearances, as representations, is, indeed, only in me, but nevertheless the real, that is, the material of all objects of outer intuition, is actually given in this space, independently of all imaginative invention. Also, it is impossible that in this space anything outside us (in the tran- scendental sense) should be given, space itself being nothing outside our sensibility. Even the most rigid idealist cannot, therefore, require a proof that the object outside us (taking 'outside' in the strict [transcendental] sense) corresponds to our perception. ++ We must give full credence to this paradoxical but correct pro- position, that there is nothing in space save what is represented in it. For space is itself nothing but representation, and whatever is in it must therefore be contained in the representation. Nothing whatso- ever is in space, save in so far as it is actually represented in it. It is a proposition which must indeed sound strange, that a thing can exist only in the representation of it, but in this case the objection falls, inasmuch as the things with which we are here concerned are not things in themselves, but appearances only, that is, representations. P 349 For if there be any such object, it could not be P 350 represented and intuited as outside us, because such repre- sentation and intuition presuppose space, and reality in space, being the reality of a mere representation, is nothing other than perception itself. The real of outer appearances is there- fore real in perception only, and can be real in no other way. From perceptions knowledge of objects can be generated, either by mere play of imagination or by way of experience; and in the process there may, no doubt, arise illusory repre- sentations to which the objects do not correspond, the decep- tion being attributable sometimes to a delusion of imagination (in dreams) and sometimes to an error of judgment in so-called sense-deception). To avoid such deceptive illusion, we have to proceed according to the rule: Whatever is connected with a perception according to empirical laws, is actual. But such deception, as well as the provision against it, affects idealism quite as much as dualism, inasmuch as we are concerned only with the form of experience. Empirical idealism, and its mis- taken questionings as to the objective reality of our outer perceptions, is already sufficiently refuted, when it has been shown that outer perception yields immediate proof of some- thing actual in space, and that this space, although in itself only a mere form of representations, has objective reality in relation to all outer appearances, which also are nothing else than mere representations; and when it has likewise been shown that in the absence of perception even imagining and dreaming are not possible, and that our outer senses, as regards the data from which experience can arise, have therefore their actual corresponding objects in space. The dogmatic idealist would be one who denies the exist- ence of matter, the sceptical idealist one who doubts its exist- ence, because holding it to be incapable of proof. The former must base his view on supposed contradictions in the pos- sibility of there being such a thing as matter at all -- a view with which we have not yet been called upon to deal. The following section on dialectical inferences, which represents reason as in strife with itself in regard to the concepts which it makes for itself of the possibility of what belongs to the P 351 connection of experience, will remove this difficulty. The sceptical idealist, however, who merely challenges the ground of our assertion and denounces as insufficiently justified our conviction of the existence of matter, which we thought to base on immediate perception, is a benefactor of human reason in so far as he compels us, even in the smallest ad- vances of ordinary experience, to keep on the watch, lest we consider as a well-earned possession what we perhaps obtain only illegitimately. We are now in a position to appreciate the value of these idealist objections. Unless we mean to contradict ourselves in our commonest assertions, they drive us by main force to view all our perceptions, whether we call them inner or outer, as a consciousness only of what is dependent on our sensibility. They also compel us to view the outer objects of these perceptions not as things in themselves, but only as representations, of which, as of every other repre- sentation, we can become immediately conscious, and which are entitled outer because they depend on what we call 'outer sense', whose intuition is space. Space itself, however, is noth- ing but an inner mode of representation in which certain perceptions are connected with one another. If we treat outer objects as things in themselves, it is quite impossible to understand how we could arrive at a knowledge of their reality outside us, since we have to rely merely on the representation which is in us. For we cannot be sentient [of what is] outside ourselves, but only [of what is] in us, and the whole of our self-consciousness therefore yields nothing save merely our own determinations. Sceptical idealism thus constrains us to have recourse to the only refuge still open, namely, the ideality of all appearances, a doctrine which has already been established in the Transcendental Aesthetic independently of these consequences, which we could not at that stage foresee. If then we ask, whether it follows that in the doctrine of the soul dualism alone is tenable, we must answer: 'Yes, certainly; but dualism only in the empirical sense'. That is to say, in the connection of experience matter, as substance in the [field of] appearance, is really given to outer sense, just as the thinking 'I', also as substance in the [field of] appearance, is given to inner sense. Further, appearances in both fields P 352 must be connected with each other according to the rules which this category introduces into that connection of our outer as well as of our inner perceptions whereby they constitute one ex- perience. If, however, as commonly happens, we seek to extend the concept of dualism, and take it in the transcendental sense, neither it nor the two counter-alternatives -- pneumatism on the one hand, materialism on the other -- would have any sort of basis, since we should then have misapplied our concepts, taking the difference in the mode of representing objects, which, as regards what they are in themselves, still remain unknown to us, as a difference in the things themselves. Though the 'I', as represented through inner sense in time, and objects in space outside me, are specifically quite distinct appearances, they are not for that reason thought as being different things. Neither the transcendental object which underlies outer ap- pearances nor that which underlies inner intuition, is in itself either matter or a thinking being, but a ground (to us un- known) of the appearances which supply to us the empirical concept of the former as well as of the latter mode of exist- ence. If then, as this critical argument obviously compels us to do, we hold fast to the rule above established, and do not push our questions beyond the limits within which possible experi- ence can present us with its object, we shall never dream of seeking to inform ourselves about the objects of our senses as they are in themselves, that is, out of all relation to the senses. But if the psychologist takes appearances for things in them- selves, and as existing in and by themselves, then whether he be a materialist who admits into his system nothing but matter alone, or a spiritualist who admits only thinking beings (that is, beings with the form of our inner sense), or a dualist who accepts both, he will always, owing to this misunderstanding, be entangled in pseudo-rational speculations as to how that which is not a thing in itself, but only the appearance of a thing in general, can exist by itself. Consideration of Pure Psychology as a whole, in view of these Paralogisms If we compare the doctrine of the soul as the physiology of inner sense, with the doctrine of the body as a physiology of P 353 the object of the outer senses, we find that while in both much can be learnt empirically, there is yet this notable difference In the latter science much that is a priori can be synthetically known from the mere concept of an extended impenetrable being, but in the former nothing whatsoever that is a priori can be known synthetically from the concept of a thinking being. The cause is this. Although both are appearances, the appearance to outer sense has something fixed or abiding which supplies a substratum as the basis of its transitory determinations and therefore a synthetic concept, namely, that of space and of an appearance in space; whereas time, which is the sole form of our inner intuition, has nothing abiding, and therefore yields knowledge only of the change of determinations, not of any object that can be thereby deter- mined. For in what we entitle 'soul', everything is in con- tinual flux and there is nothing abiding except (if we must so express ourselves) the 'I', which is simple solely because its representation has no content, and therefore no manifold, and for this reason seems to represent, or (to use a more correct term) denote, a simple object. In order that it should be possible, by pure reason, to obtain knowledge of the nature of a thinking being in general, this 'I' would have to be an intuition which, in being presupposed in all thought (prior to all experience), might as intuition yield a priori synthetic propositions. This 'I' is, however, as little an intuition as it is a concept of any object; it is the mere form of consciousness, which can accom- pany the two kinds of representation and which is in a position to elevate them to the rank of knowledge only in so far as some- thing else is given in intuition which provides material for a representation of an object. Thus the whole of rational psy- chology, as a science surpassing all powers of human reason, proves abortive, and nothing is left for us but to study our soul under the guidance of experience, and to confine ourselves to those questions which do not go beyond the limits within which a content can be provided for them by possible inner experience. But although rational psychology cannot be used to extend knowledge, and when so employed is entirely made up of value, if it is taken as nothing more than a critical treatment P 354 of our dialectical inferences, those that arise from the common and natural reason of men. Why do we have resort to a doctrine of the soul founded exclusively on pure principles of reason? Beyond all doubt, chiefly in order to secure our thinking self against the danger of materialism. This is achieved by means of the pure con- cept of our thinking self which we have just given. For by this teaching so completely are we freed from the fear that on the removal of matter all thought, and even the very existence of thinking beings, would be destroyed, that on the contrary it is clearly shown, that if I remove the thinking subject the whole corporeal world must at once vanish: it is nothing save an appearance in the sensibility of our subject and a mode of its representations. I admit that this does not give me any further knowledge of the properties of this thinking self, nor does it enable me to determine its permanence or even that it exists independently of what we may conjecture to be the transcendental sub- stratum of outer appearances; for the latter is just as un- known to me as is the thinking self. But it is nevertheless possible that I may find cause, on other than merely specu- lative grounds, to hope for an independent and continuing existence of my thinking nature, throughout all possible change of my state. In that case much will already have been gained if, while freely confessing my own ignorance, I am yet in a position to repel the dogmatic assaults of a speculative op- ponent, and to show him that he can never know more of the nature of the self in denying the possibility of my expectations than I can know in clinging to them. Three other dialectical questions, constituting the real goal of rational psychology, are grounded on this transcend- ental illusion in our psychological concepts, and cannot be decided except by means of the above enquiries: namely (1) of the possibility of the communion of the soul with an organised body, i.e. concerning animality and the state of the soul in the life of man; (2) of the beginning of this communion, that is, of the soul in and before birth; (3) of the end of this communion, that is, of the soul in and after death (the question of im- mortality). P 355 Now I maintain that all the difficulties commonly found in these questions, and by means of which, as dogmatic objections, men seek to gain credit for a deeper insight into the nature of things than any to which the ordinary understanding can properly lay claim, rest on a mere delusion by which they hypostatise what exists merely in thought, and take it as a real object existing, in the same character, outside the thinking sub- ject. In other words, they regard extension, which is nothing but appearance, as a property of outer things that subsists even apart from our sensibility, and hold that motion is due to these things and really occurs in and by itself, apart from our senses. For matter, the communion of which with the soul arouses so much questioning, is nothing but a mere form, or a particular way of representing an unknown object by means of that intuition which is called outer sense. There may well be something outside us to which this appearance, which we call matter, corresponds; in its character of appear- ance it is not, however, outside us, but is only a thought in us, although this thought, owing to the above-mentioned outer sense, represents it as existing outside us. Matter, therefore, does not mean a kind of substance quite distinct and hetero- geneous from the object of inner sense (the soul), but only the distinctive nature of those appearances of objects -- in them- selves unknown to us -- the representations of which we call outer as compared with those which we count as belonging to inner sense, although like all other thoughts these outer repre- sentations belong only to the thinking subject. They have, indeed, this deceptive property that, representing objects in space, they detach themselves as it were from the soul and appear to hover outside it. Yet the very space in which they are intuited is nothing but a representation, and no counter- part of the same quality is to be found outside the soul. Con- sequently, the question is no longer of the communion of the soul with other known substances of a different kind outside us, but only of the connection of the representations of inner sense with the modifications of our outer sensibility -- as to how these can be so connected with each other according to settled laws that they exhibit the unity of a coherent experience. As long as we take inner and outer appearances together as mere representations in experience, we find nothing absurd P 356 and strange in the association of the two kinds of senses. But as soon as we hypostatise outer appearances and come to re- gard them not as representations but as things existing by them- selves outside us, with the same quality as that with which they exist in us, and as bringing to bear on our thinking subject the activities which they exhibit as appearances in relation to each other, then the efficient causes outside us assume a character which is irreconcilable with their effects in us. For the cause re- lates only to outer sense, the effect to inner sense -- senses which, although combined in one subject, are extremely unlike each other. In outer sense we find no other outer effects save changes of place, and no forces except mere tendencies which issue in spatial relations as their effects. Within us, on the other hand, the effects are thoughts, among which is not to be found any relation of place, motion, shape, or other spatial determina- tion, and we altogether lose the thread of the causes in the effects to which they are supposed to have given rise in inner sense. We ought, however, to bear in mind that bodies are not objects in themselves which are present to us, but a mere appearance of we know not what unknown object; that motion is not the effect of this unknown cause, but only the appearance of its influence on our senses. Neither bodies nor motions are anything outside us; both alike are mere representations in us; and it is not, therefore, the motion of matter that produces re- presentations in us; the motion itself is representation only, as also is the matter which makes itself known in this way. Thus in the end the whole difficulty which we have made for our- selves comes to this, how and why the representations of our sensibility are so interconnected that those which we entitle outer intuitions can be represented according to empirical laws as objects outside us -- a question which is not in any way bound up with the supposed difficulty of explaining the origin of our representations from quite heterogeneous efficient causes outside us. That difficulty has arisen from our taking the appearances of an unknown cause as being the cause itself outside us, a view which can result in no- thing but confusion. In the case of judgments in which a misapprehension has taken deep root through long custom, it is impossible at once to give to their correction that clarity P 357 which can be achieved in other cases where no such inevitable illusion confuses the concept. Our freeing of reason from sophistical theories can hardly, therefore, at this stage have the clearness which is necessary for its complete success. The following comments will, I think, be helpful as contri- buting towards this ultimate clarity. All objections can be divided into dogmatic, critical, and sceptical. A dogmatic objection is directed against a proposi- tion, a critical objection against the proof of a proposition. The former requires an insight into the nature of the object such that we can maintain the opposite of what the proposi- tion has alleged in regard to this object. It is therefore itself dogmatic, claiming acquaintance with the constitution of the object fuller than that of the counter-assertion. A critical objec- tion, since it leaves the validity or invalidity of the proposition unchallenged, and assails only the proof, does not presuppose fuller acquaintance with the object or oblige us to claim superior knowledge of its nature; it shows only that the asser- tion is unsupported, not that it is wrong. A sceptical objec- tion sets assertion and counter-assertion in mutual opposition to each other as having equal weight, treating each in turn as dogma and the other as the objection thereto. And the con- flict, as the being thus seemingly dogmatic on both the oppos- ing sides, is taken as showing that all judgment in regard to the object is completely null and void. Thus dogmatic and sceptical objections alike lay claim to such insight into their object as is required to assert or to deny something in regard to it. A critical objection, on the other hand, confines itself to pointing out that in the making of the assertion some- thing has been presupposed that is void and merely fictitious; and it thus overthrows the theory by removing its alleged foundation without claiming to establish anything that bears directly upon the constitution of the object. So long as we hold to the ordinary concepts of our reason with regard to the communion in which our thinking subject stands with the things outside us, we are dogmatic, looking upon them as real objects existing independently of us, in accordance with a certain transcendental dualism which does not assign these outer appearances to the subject as representations, but sets them, just as they are given us in P 358 sensible intuition, as objects outside us, completely separ- ating them from the thinking subject. This subreption is the basis of all theories in regard to the communion between soul and body. The objective reality thus assigned to ap- pearances is never brought into question. On the contrary, it is taken for granted; the theorising is merely as to the mode in which it has to be explained and understood. There are three usual systems devised on these lines, and they are indeed the only possible systems: that of physical influence, that of predetermined harmony, and that of supernatural intervention. The two last methods of explaining the communion be- tween the soul and matter are based on objections to the first view, which is that of common sense. It is argued, namely, that what appears as matter cannot by its immediate influence be the cause of representations, these being effects which are quite different in kind from matter. Now those who take this line cannot attach to what they understand by 'object of outer senses' the concept of a matter which is nothing but ap- pearance, and so itself a mere representation produced by some sort of outer objects. For in that case they would be say- ing that the representations of outer objects (appearances) can- not be outer causes of the representations in our mind; and this would be a quite meaningless objection, since no one could dream of holding that what he has once come to recognise as mere representation, is an outer cause. On our principles they can establish their theory only by showing that that which is the true (transcendental) object of our outer senses cannot be the cause of those representations (appearances) which we comprehend under the title 'matter'. No one, however, can have the right to claim that he knows anything in regard to the transcendental cause of our representations of the outer senses; and their assertion is therefore entirely groundless. If, on the other hand, those who profess to improve upon the doctrine of physical influence keep to the ordinary outlook of transcend- ental dualism, and suppose matter, as such, to be a thing-in- itself (not the mere appearance of an unknown thing), they will direct their objection to showing that such an outer object, which in itself exhibits no causality save that of movements, can never be the efficient cause of representations, but that a P 359 third entity must intervene to establish, if not reciprocal inter- action, at least correspondence and harmony between the two. But in arguing in this way, they begin their refutation by ad- mitting into their dualism the proton pseudos of [a doctrine of] physical influence, and consequently their objection is not so much a disproof of natural influence as of their own dualistic presupposition. For the difficulties in regard to the connection of our thinking nature with matter have their origin, one and all, in the illicitly assumed dualistic view, that matter as such is not appearance, that is, a mere representation of the mind to which an unknown object corresponds, but is the object in itself as it exists outside us independently of all sensibility. As against the commonly accepted doctrine of physical in- fluence, an objection of the dogmatic type is not, therefore, practicable. For if the opponent of the doctrine accepts the view that matter and its motion are mere appearances and so themselves mere representations, his difficulty is then simply this, that it is impossible that the unknown object of our sensi- bility should be the cause of the representations in us. He can- not, however, have the least justification for any such conten- tion, since no one is in a position to decide what an unknown object may or may not be able to do. And this transcendental idealism, as we have just proved, he cannot but concede. His only way of escape would be frankly to hypostatise representa- tions, and to set them outside himself as real things. The doctrine of physical influence, in its ordinary form, is, however, subject to a well-founded critical objection. The alleged communion between two kinds of substances, the thinking and the extended, rests on a crude dualism, and treats the extended substances, which are really nothing but mere representations of the thinking subject, as existing by themselves. This mistaken interpretation of physical in- fluence can thus be effectively disposed of: we have shown that the proof of it is void and illicit. The much-discussed question of the communion between the thinking and the extended, if we leave aside all that is merely fictitious, comes then simply to this: how in a thinking subject outer intuition, namely, that of space, with its filling- in of shape and motion, is possible. And this is a question which no man can possibly answer. This gap in our knowledge P 360 can never be filled; all that can be done is to indicate it through the ascription of outer appearances to that transcendental ob- ject which is the cause of this species of representations, but of which we can have no knowledge whatsoever and of which we shall never acquire any concept. In all problems which may arise in the field of experience we treat these appearances as objects in themselves, without troubling ourselves about the primary ground of their possibility (as appearances). But to advance beyond these limits the concept of a transcendental object would be indispensably required. The settlement of all disputes or objections which concern the state of the thinking nature prior to this communion (prior to life), or after the cessation of such communion (in death), rests upon these considerations regarding the communion between thinking beings and extended beings. The opinion that the thinking subject has been capable of thought prior to any communion with bodies would now appear as an assertion that, prior to the beginning of the species of sensibility in virtue of which something appears to us in space, those tran- scendental objects, which in our present state appear as bodies, could have been intuited in an entirely different manner. The opinion that the soul after the cessation of all communion with the corporeal world could still continue to think, would be formulated as the view that, if that species of sensibility, in virtue of which transcendental objects, at present quite un- known to us, appear as a material world, should cease, all in- tuition of the transcendental objects would not for that reason be removed, and it would still be quite possible that those same unknown objects should continue to be known by the thinking subject, though no longer, indeed, in the quality of bodies. Now on speculative principles no one can give the least ground for any such assertion. Even the possibility of what is asserted cannot be established; it can only be assumed. But it is equally impossible for anyone to bring any valid dogmatic objection against it. For whoever he may be, he knows just as little of the absolute, inner cause of outer corporeal appear- ances as I or anybody else. Since he cannot, therefore, offer any justification for claiming to know on what the outer ap- pearances in our present state (that of life) really rest, neither can he know that the condition of all outer intui- P 361 tion or the thinking subject itself, will cease with this state (in death). Thus all controversy in regard to the nature of the thinking being and its connection with the corporeal world is merely a re- sult of filling the gap where knowledge is wholly lacking to us with paralogisms of reason, treating our thoughts as things and hypostatising them. Hence originates an imaginary science, imaginary both in the case of him who affirms and of him who denies, since all parties either suppose some knowledge of objects of which no human being has any concept, or treat their own representations as objects, and so revolve in a per- petual circle of ambiguities and contradictions. Nothing but the sobriety of a critique, at once strict and just, can free us from this dogmatic delusion, which through the lure of an imagined felicity keeps so many in bondage to theories and systems. Such a critique confines all our speculative claims rigidly to the field of possible experience; and it does this not by shallow scoffing at ever-repeated failures or pious sighs over the limits of our reason, but by an effective determining of these limits in accordance with established principles, inscribing its nihil ulterius on those Pillars of Hercules which nature herself has erected in order that the voyage of our reason may be ex- tended no further than the continuous coastline of experience itself reaches -- a coast we cannot leave without venturing upon a shoreless ocean which, after alluring us with ever- deceptive prospects, compels us in the end to abandon as hopeless all this vexatious and tedious endeavour. * * * We still owe the reader a clear general exposition of the transcendental and yet natural illusion in the paralogisms of pure reason, and also a justification of the systematic ordering of them which runs parallel with the table of the categories. We could not have attempted to do so at the beginning of this section without running the risk of becoming obscure or of clumsily anticipating the course of our argument. We shall now try to fulfil this obligation. All illusion may be said to consist in treating the subjective condition of thinking as being knowledge of the object. Further in the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic we have P 362 shown that pure reason concerns itself solely with the totality of the synthesis of the conditions, for a given conditioned. Now since the dialectical illusion of pure reason cannot be an em- pirical illusion, such as occurs in certain specific instances of empirical knowledge, it will relate to what is universal in the conditions of thinking, and there will therefore be only three cases of the dialectical employment of pure reason. 1. The synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general. 2. The synthesis of the conditions of empirical thinking. 3. The synthesis of the conditions of pure thinking. In all these three cases pure reason occupies itself only with the absolute totality of this synthesis, that is, with that condition which is itself unconditioned. On this division is founded the threefold transcendental illusion which gives occasion for the three main sections of the Dialectic, and for the three pretended sciences of pure reason -- transcendental psychology, cosmology, and theology. Here we are concerned only with the first. Since, in thinking in general, we abstract from all relation of the thought to any object (whether of the senses or of the pure understanding), the synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general (No. 1) is not objective at all, but merely a synthesis of the thought with the subject, which is mistaken for a synthetic representation of an object. It follows from this that the dialectical inference to the condition of all thought in general, which is itself uncon- ditioned, does not commit a material error (for it abstracts from all content or objects), but is defective in form alone, and must therefore be called a paralogism. Further, since the one condition which accompanies all thought is the 'I' in the universal proposition 'I think', reason has to deal with this condition in so far as it is itself unconditioned. It is only the formal condition, namely, the logical unity of every thought, in which I abstract from all objects; but nevertheless it is represented as an object which I think, namely, I myself and its unconditioned unity. If anyone propounds to me the question, 'What is the con- P 363 stitution of a thing which thinks? ', I have no a priori know- ledge wherewith to reply. For the answer has to be synthetic -- an analytic answer will perhaps explain what is meant by thought, but beyond this cannot yield any knowledge of that upon which this thought depends for its possibility. For a synthetic solution, however, intuition is always required; and owing to the highly general character of the problem, intuition has been left entirely out of account. Similarly no one can answer in all its generality the question, 'What must a thing be, to be movable? ' For the question contains no trace of the answer, viz. impenetrable extension (matter). But although I have no general answer to the former question, it still seems as if I could reply in the special case of the proposition which ex- presses self-consciousness -- 'I think'. For this 'I' is the primary subject, that is, substance; it is simple, etc. But these would then have to be propositions derived from experience, and in the absence of a universal rule which expresses the conditions of the possibility of thought in general and a priori, they could not contain any such non-empirical predicates. Suspicion is thus thrown on the view, which at first seemed to me so plausible, that we can form judgments about the nature of a thinking being, and can do so from concepts alone. But the error in this way of thinking has not yet been detected. Further investigation into the origin of the attributes which I ascribe to myself as a thinking being in general can, however, show in what the error consists. These attributes are nothing but pure categories, by which I do not think a determinate ob- ject but only the unity of the representations -- in order to deter- mine an object for them. In the absence of an underlying intui- tion the category cannot by itself yield a concept of an object; for by intuition alone is the object given, which thereupon is thought in accordance with the category. If I am to declare a thing to be a substance in the [field of] appearance, predicates of its in- tuition must first be given me, and I must be able to distinguish in these the permanent from the transitory and the substratum (the thing itself) from what is merely inherent in it. If I call a thing in the [field of] appearance simple, I mean by this that the intuition of it, although a part of the appearance, is not P 364 itself capable of being divided into parts, etc. But if I know something as simple in concept only and not in the [field of] appearance, I have really no knowledge whatsoever of the object, but only of the concept which I make for myself of a something in general that does not allow of being intuited. I say that I think something as completely simple, only because I have really nothing more to say of it than merely that it is something. Now the bare apperception, 'I', is in concept substance, in concept simple, etc. ; and in this sense all those psychological doctrines are unquestionably true. Yet this does not give us that knowledge of the soul for which we are seeking. For since none of these predicates are valid of intuition, they cannot have any consequences which are applicable to objects of experience, and are therefore entirely void. The concept of substance does not teach me that the soul endures by itself, nor that it is a part of outer intuitions which cannot itself be divided into parts, and cannot therefore arise or perish by any natural alterations. These are properties which would make the soul known to me in the context of experience and might reveal something concerning its origin and future state. But if I say, in terms of the mere category, 'The soul is a simple substance', it is obvious that since the bare concept of sub- stance (supplied by the understanding) contains nothing be- yond the requirement that a thing be represented as being subject in itself, and not in turn predicate of anything else, nothing follows from this as regards the permanence of the 'I', and the attribute 'simple' certainly does not aid in adding this permanence. Thus, from this source, we learn nothing whatsoever as to what may happen to the soul in the changes of the natural world. If we could be assured that the soul is a simple part of matter, we could use this knowledge, with the further assistance of what experience teaches in this regard, to deduce the permanence, and, as involved in its simple nature, the indestructibility of the soul. But of all this, the concept of the 'I', in the psychological principle 'I think', tells us nothing. That the being which thinks in us is under the impression that it knows itself through pure categories, and precisely P 365 through those categories which in each type of category express absolute unity, is due to the following reason. Apper- ception is itself the ground of the possibility of the categories, which on their part represent nothing but the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, in so far as the manifold has unity in apperception. Self-consciousness in general is therefore the representation of that which is the condition of all unity, and itself is unconditioned. We can thus say of the thinking 'I' (the soul) which regards itself as substance, as simple, as numerically identical at all times, and as the correlate of all existence, from which all other existence must be inferred, that it does not know itself through the categories, but knows the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and so through itself. Now it is, in- deed, very evident that I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose in order to know any object, and that the determining self (the thought) is distinguished from the self that is to be determined (the thinking subject) in the same way as knowledge is distinguished from its object. Neverthe- less there is nothing more natural and more misleading than the illusion which leads us to regard the unity in the synthesis of thoughts as a perceived unity in the subject of these thoughts. We might call it the subreption of the hypostatised conscious- ness (apperceptionis substantiatae). If we desire to give a logical title to the paralogism con- tained in the dialectical syllogisms of the rational doctrine of the soul, then in view of the fact that their premisses are cor- rect, we may call it a sophisma figurae dictionis. Whereas the major premiss, in dealing with the condition, makes a merely transcendental use of the category, the minor premiss and the conclusion, in dealing with the soul which has been subsumed under this condition, use the same category empirically. Thus, for instance, in the paralogism of substantiality, the con- cept of substance is a pure intellectual concept, which in the absence of the conditions of sensible intuition admits only of transcendental use, that is, admits of no use whatsoever. But in the minor premiss the very same concept is applied to the object P 366 of all inner experience without our having first ascertained and established the condition of such employment in concreto, namely, the permanence of this object. We are thus making an empirical, but in this case inadmissible, employment of the category. Finally, in order to show the systematic interconnection of all these dialectical assertions of a pseudo-rational doctrine of the soul in an order determined by pure reason, and so to show that we have them in their completeness, we may note that apperception has been carried through all the classes of the categories but only in reference to those concepts of under- standing which in each class form the basis of the unity of the others in a possible perception, namely, subsistence, reality, unity (not plurality), and existence. Reason here represents all of these as conditions, which are themselves unconditioned, of the possibility of a thinking being. Thus the soul knows in itself -- (1) the unconditioned unity of relation, i.e. that it itself is not inherent [in something else] but self-subsistent. (2) the unconditioned unity of quality, that is, that it is not a real whole but simple. (3) the unconditioned unity in the plurality in time, i.e. that it is not numerically different at different times but one and the very same subject. (4) the unconditioned unity of existence in space, i.e. that it is not the consciousness of many things outside it, but the consciousness of the existence of itself only, and of other things merely as its representations. Reason is the faculty of principles. The assertions of pure psychology do not contain empirical predicates of the soul but those predicates, if there be any such, which are meant to de- termine the object in itself independently of experience, and so by mere reason. They ought, therefore, to be founded on principles and universal concepts bearing on the nature of thinking beings in ge neral. ++ How the simple here again corresponds to the category of reality I am not yet in a position to explain. This will be shown in the next chapter on the occasion of this same concept being put by reason to yet another use. P 367 But instead we find that the single representation, 'I am', governs them all. This representation just because it expresses the pure formula of all my experience in general announces itself as a universal proposition valid for all thinking beings; and since it is at the same time in all respects unitary, it carries with it the illusion of an absolute unity of the conditions of thought in general, and so extends itself further than possible experience can reach. P 368 THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON SINCE the proposition 'I think' (taken problematically) con- tains the form of each and every judgment of understanding and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is evident that the inferences from it admit only of a transcendental em- ployment of the understanding. And since this employment excludes any admixture of experience, we cannot, after what has been shown above, entertain any favourable anticipations in regard to its methods of procedure. We therefore propose to follow it, with a critical eye, through all the predicaments of pure psychology. But for the sake of brevity the examination had best proceed in an unbroken continuity. The following general remark may, at the outset, aid us in our scrutiny of this kind of argument. I do not know an object merely in that I think, but only in so far as I determine a given intuition with respect to the unity of consciousness in which all thought consists. Consequently, I do not know myself through being conscious of myself as thinking, but only when I am con- scious of the intuition of myself as determined with respect to the function of thought. Modi of self-consciousness in thought are not by themselves concepts of objects (categories), but are mere functions which do not give thought an object to be known, and accordingly do not give even myself as object. The object is not the consciousness of the determining self, but only that of the determinable self, that is, of my inner intuition (in so far as its manifold can be combined in accordance with the universal condition of the unity of apper- ception in thought). P 369 (1) In all judgments I am the determining subject of that relation which constitutes the judgment. That the 'I', the 'I' that thinks, can be regarded always as subject, and as something which does not belong to thought as a mere predicate, must be granted. It is an apodeictic and indeed identical proposition; but it does not mean that I, as object, am for myself a self- subsistent being or substance. The latter statement goes very far beyond the former, and demands for its proof data which are not to be met with in thought, and perhaps (in so far as I have regard to the thinking self merely as such) are more than I shall ever find in it. (2) That the 'I' of apperception, and therefore the 'I' in every act of thought, is one, and cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and consequently signifies a logically simple subject, is something already contained in the very concept of thought, and is therefore an analytic proposition. But this does not mean that the thinking 'I' is a simple sub- stance. That proposition would be synthetic. The concept of substance always relates to intuitions which cannot in me be other than sensible, and which therefore lie entirely outside the field of the understanding and its thought. But it is of this thought that we are speaking when we say that the 'I' in thought is simple. It would, indeed, be surprising if what in other cases requires so much labour to determine -- namely, what, of all that is presented in intuition, is substance, and further, whether this substance can be simple (e.g. in the parts of matter) -- should be thus given me directly, as if by revelation, in the poorest of all representations. (3) The proposition, that in all the manifold of which I am conscious I am identical with myself, is likewise implied in the concepts themselves, and is therefore an analytic proposition. But this identity of the subject, of which I can be conscious in all my representations, does not concern any intuition of the subject, whereby it is given as object, and cannot therefore signify the identity of the person, if by that is understood the consciousness of the identity of one's own substance, as a thinking being, in all change of its states. No mere analysis of the proposition 'I think' will suffice to prove such a proposi- P 370 tion; for that we should require various synthetic judgments, based upon given intuition. (4) That I distinguish my own existence as that of a thinking being, from other things outside me--among them my body -- is likewise an analytic proposition; for other things are such as I think to be distinct from myself. But I do not thereby learn whether this consciousness of myself would be even possible apart from things outside me through which representations are given to me, and whether, therefore, I could exist merely as thinking being (i.e. without existing in human form). The analysis, then, of the consciousness of myself in thought in general, yields nothing whatsoever towards the knowledge of myself as object. The logical exposition of thought in general has been mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the object. Indeed, it would be a great stumbling-block, or rather would be the one unanswerable objection, to our whole cri- tique, if there were a possibility of proving a priori that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, and that consequently (as follows from this same mode of proof) per- sonality is inseparable from them, and that they are conscious of their existence as separate and distinct from all matter. For by such procedure we should have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have entered into the field of noumena; and no one could then deny our right of advancing yet further in this domain, indeed of settling in it, and, should our star prove auspicious, of establishing claims to permanent posses- sion. The proposition, 'Every thinking being is, as such, a simple substance', is a synthetic a priori proposition; it is syn- thetic in that it goes beyond the concept from which it starts, and adds to the thought in general [i.e. to the concept of a thinking being] the mode of [its] existence: it is a priori, in that it adds to the concept a predicate (that of simplicity) which cannot be given in any experience. It would then follow that a priori synthetic propositions are possible and admis- sible, not only, as we have asserted, in relation to objects of possible experience, and indeed as principles of the possibility of this experience, but that they are applicable to things in general and to things in themselves -- a result that would make P 371 an end of our whole critique, and would constrain us to ac- quiesce in the old-time procedure. Upon closer consideration we find, however, that there is no such serious danger. The whole procedure of rational psychology is determined by a paralogism, which is exhibited in the following syllogism: That which cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance. A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject. Therefore it exists also only as subject, that is, as substance. In the major premiss we speak of a being that can be thought in general, in every relation, and therefore also as it may be given in intuition. But in the minor premiss we speak of it only in so far as it regards itself, as subject, simply in relation to thought and the unity of consciousness, and not as likewise in relation to the intuition through which it is given as object to thought. Thus the conclusion is arrived at fallaci- ously, per sophisma figurae dictionis. That we are entirely right in resolving this famous argu- ment into a paralogism will be clearly seen, if we call to mind what has been said in the General Note to the Systematic Representation of the Principles and in the Section on Nou- mena. ++ 'Thought' is taken in the two premisses in totally different senses: in the major premiss, as relating to an object in general and therefore to an object as it may be given in intuition; in the minor premiss, only as it consists in relation to self-consciousness. In this latter sense, no object whatsoever is being thought; all that is being represented is simply the relation to self as subject (as the form of thought). In the former premiss we are speaking of things which cannot be thought otherwise than as subjects; but in the latter premiss we speak not of things but of thought (abstraction being made from all objects) in which the 'I' always serves as the subject of consciousness. The conclusion cannot, therefore, be, 'I cannot exist otherwise than as subject', but merely, 'In thinking my exist- ence, I cannot employ myself, save as subject of the judgment [therein involved]'. This is an identical proposition, and casts no light whatsoever upon the mode of my existence. P 371 For it has there been proved that the concept of a thing P 372 which can exist by itself as subject and never as mere predi- cate, carries with it no objective reality; in other words, that we cannot know whether there is any object to which the concept is applicable -- as to the possibility of such a mode of existence we have no means of deciding -- and that the concept therefore yields no knowledge whatsoever. If by the term 'substance' be meant an object which can be given, and if it is to yield know- ledge, it must be made to rest on a permanent intuition, as being that through which alone the object of our concept can be given, and as being, therefore, the indispensable condition of the objective reality of the concept. Now in inner intuition there is nothing permanent, for the 'I' is merely the conscious- ness of my thought. So long, therefore, as we do not go beyond mere thinking, we are without the necessary condition for applying the concept of substance, that is, of a self-subsistent subject, to the self as a thinking being. And with the objective reality of the concept of substance, the allied concept of simplicity likewise vanishes; it is transformed into a merely logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thought in general, which has to be present whether the subject be com- posite or not. REFUTATION OF MENDELSSOHN'S PROOF OF THE PERMANENCE OF THE SOUL This acute philosopher soon noticed that the usual argu- ment by which it is sought to prove that the soul -- if it be admitted to be a simple being -- cannot cease to be through dissolution, is insufficient for its purpose, that of proving the necessary continuance of the soul, since it may be supposed to pass out of existence through simply vanishing. In his Phaedo he endeavoured to prove that the soul cannot be subject to such a process of vanishing, which would be a true annihilation, by showing that a simple being cannot cease to exist. His argument is that since the soul cannot be diminished, and so gradually lose something of its exist- ence, being by degrees changed into nothing (for since it has no parts, it has no multiplicity in itself), there would be P 373 no time between a moment in which it is and another in which it is not -- which is impossible. He failed, however, to observe that even if we admit the simple nature of the soul, namely, that it contains no manifold of constituents external to one another, and therefore no extensive quantity, we yet cannot deny to it, any more than to any other existence, intensive quantity, that is, a degree of reality in respect of all its facul- ties, nay, in respect of all that constitutes its existence, and that this degree of reality may diminish through all the in- finitely many smaller degrees. In this manner the supposed substance -- the thing, the permanence of which has not yet been proved -- may be changed into nothing, not indeed by dissolution, but by gradual loss (remissio) of its powers, and so, if I may be permitted the use of the term, by elanguescence. For consciousness itself has always a degree, which always allows of diminution, and the same must also hold of the faculty of being conscious of the self, and likewise of all the other faculties. Thus the permanence of the soul, regarded merely as object of inner sense, remains undemonstrated, and indeed indemonstrable. Its permanence during life is, of course, evident per se, since the thinking being (as man) is itself like- wise an object of the outer senses. But this is very far from satisfying the rational psychologist who undertakes to prove from mere concepts its absolute permanence beyond this life. ++ Clearness is not, as the logicians assert, the consciousness of a representation. A certain degree of consciousness, though it be insufficient for recollection, must be met with even in many obscure representations, since in the absence of all consciousness we should make no distinction between different combinations of obscure repre- sentations, which yet we are able to do in respect of the characters of many concepts, such as those of right or equity, or as when the musician in improvising strikes several keys at once. But a repre- sentation is clear, when the consciousness suffices for the conscious- ness of the distinction of this representation from others. If it suffices for distinguishing, but not for consciousness of the distinction, the representation must still be entitled obscure. There are therefore infinitely many degrees of consciousness, down to its complete vanishing. ++ Some philosophers, in making out a case for a new possibility, consider that they have done enough if they can defy others to show any contradiction in their assumptions. P 374 If we take the above propositions in synthetic connec- tion, as valid for all thinking beings, as indeed they must be taken in the system of rational psychology, and proceed from the category of relation, with the proposition, 'All think- ing beings are, as such, substances', backwards through the series of the propositions, until the circle is completed, we P 375 come at last to the existence of these thinking beings. P 374n ++This is the procedure of all those who profess to comprehend the possibility of thought -- of which they have an example only in the empirical intuitions of our human life -- even after this life has ceased. But those who resort to such a method of argument can be quite nonplussed by the citation of other possibilities which are not a whit more adventurous. Such is the possibility of the division of a simple substance into several substances, and conversely the fusing together (coalition) of several into one simple substance. For although divisibility presupposes a composite, it does not necessarily require a composite of substances, but only of degrees (of the manifold powers) of one and the same sub- stance. Now just as we can think all powers and faculties of the soul, even that of consciousness, as diminished by one half, but in such a way that the substance still remains, so also, without contradiction, we can represent this extinguished half as being preserved, not in the soul, but outside it; and we can likewise hold that since every- thing which is real in it, and which therefore has a degree -- in other words, its entire existence, from which nothing is lacking -- has been halved, another separate substance would then come into existence outside it. For the multiplicity which has been divided existed before, not indeed as a multiplicity of substances, but as the multi- plicity of every reality proper to the substance, that is, of the quan- tum of existence in it; and the unity of substance was therefore only a mode of existence, which in virtue of this division has been trans- formed into a plurality of subsistence. Similarly, several simple sub- stances might be fused into one, without anything being lost except only the plurality of subsistence, inasmuch as the one substance would contain the degree of reality of all the former substances to- gether. We might perhaps also represent the simple substances which yield us the appearance [which we entitle] matter as producing -- not indeed by a mechanical or chemical influence upon one another, but by an influence unknown to us, of which the former influence would be merely the appearance -- the souls of children, that is, as pro- ducing them through such dynamical division of the parent souls, considered as intensive quantities, and those parent souls as making good their loss through coalition with new material of the same kind. P 375 Now in this system of rational psychology these beings are taken not only as being conscious of their existence independently of outer things, but as also being able, in and by themselves, to determine that existence in respect of the permanence which is a necessary characteristic of substance. This rationalist sys- tem is thus unavoidably committed to idealism, or at least to problematic idealism. For if the existence of outer things is not in any way required for determination of one's own existence in time, the assumption of their existence is a quite gratuitous assumption, of which no proof can ever be given. If, on the other hand, we should proceed analytically, starting from the proposition 'I think', as a proposition that already in itself includes an existence as given, and therefore modality, and analysing it in order to ascertain its content, and so to discover whether and how this 'I' determines its existence in space or time solely through that content, then the propositions of the rational doctrine of the soul would not begin with the concept of a thinking being in general, but with a reality, and we should infer from the manner in which this reality is thought, after everything empirical in it has been removed, what it is that belongs to a thinking being in general. This is shown in the following table: ++ I am far from allowing any serviceableness or validity to such fancies; and as the principles of our Analytic have sufficiently demonstrated, no other than an empirical employment of the categories (including that of substance) is possible. But if the rationalist is bold enough, out of the mere faculty of thought, without any permanent intuition whereby an object might be given, to construct a self-subsistent being, and this merely on the ground that the unity of apperception in thought does not allow of its being explained [as arising] out of the composite, instead of admitting, as he ought to do, that he is unable to explain the possibility of a thinking nature, why should not the materialist, though he can as little appeal to experience in support of his [con- jectured] possibilities, be justified in being equally daring, and in using his principle to establish the opposite conclusion, while still preserving the formal unity upon which his opponent has relied. P 376 1. I think, 2. as subject, 3. as simple subject, 4. as identical subject in every state of my thought. In the second proposition it has not been determined whether I can exist and be thought as subject only, and not also as a predicate of another being, and accordingly the con- cept of a subject is here taken in a merely logical sense, and it remains undetermined whether or not we are to understand by it a substance. Similarly, the third proposition establishes nothing in regard to the constitution or subsistence of the sub- ject; none the less in this proposition the absolute unity of apper- ception, the simple 'I' in the representation to which all com- bination or separation that constitutes thought relates, has its own importance. For apperception is something real, and its simplicity is already given in the mere fact of its possibility. Now in space there is nothing real which can be simple; points, which are the only simple things in space, are merely limits not themselves anything that can as parts serve to constitute space. From this follows the impossibility of any explana- tion in materialist terms of the constitution of the self as a merely thinking subject. But since my existence is taken in the first proposition as given -- for it does not say that every thinking being exists, which would be to assert its absolute necessity and therefore to say too much, but only, 'I exist thinking' -- the proposition is empirical, and can determine my existence only in relation to my representations in time. But since for this purpose I again require something perma- nent, which, so far as I think myself, is in no way given to me in inner intuition, it is quite impossible, by means of this simple self-consciousness, to determine the manner in which I exist, whether it be as substance or as accident. Thus, if materialism is disqualified from explaining my existence, spiritualism is equally incapable of doing so; and the conclusion is that in no way whatsoever can we know anything of the constitution of the soul, so far as the possibility of its separate existence is concerned. How, indeed, should it be possible, by means of the unity P 377 of consciousness -- which we only know because we cannot but make use of it, as indispensable for the possibility of experience -- to pass out beyond experience (our existence in this life), and even to extend our knowledge to the nature of all thinking beings in general, through the empirical, but in respect of every sort of intuition the quite indeterminate pro- position, 'I think'? Rational psychology exists not as doctrine, furnishing an addition to our knowledge of the self, but only as discipline. It sets impassable limits to speculative reason in this field, and thus keeps us, on the one hand, from throwing ourselves into the arms of a soulless materialism, or, on the other hand, from losing ourselves in a spiritualism which must be quite un- founded so long as we remain in this present life. But though it furnishes no positive doctrine, it reminds us that we should regard this refusal of reason to give satisfying response to our inquisitive probings into what is beyond the limits of this present life as reason's hint to divert our self-knowledge from fruitless and extravagant speculation to fruitful practical em- ployment. Though in such practical employment it is directed always to objects of experience only, it derives its principles from a higher source, and determines us to regulate our actions as if our destiny reached infinitely far beyond experience, and therefore far beyond this present life. From all this it is evident that rational psychology owes its origin simply to misunderstanding. The unity of conscious- ness, which underlies the categories, is here mistaken for an intuition of the subject as object, and the category of sub- stance is then applied to it. But this unity is only unity in thought, by which alone no object is given, and to which, therefore, the category of substance, which always presup- poses a given intuition, cannot be applied. Consequently, this subject cannot be known. The subject of the categories cannot by thinking the categories acquire a concept of itself as an object of the categories. For in order to think them, its pure self-consciousness, which is what was to be explained, must itself be presupposed. Similarly, the subject, in which the re- presentation of time has its original ground, cannot thereby determine its own existence in time. And if this latter is im- possible, the former, as a determination of the self (as a P 378 thinking being in general) by means of the categories is equally so. Thus the expectation of obtaining knowledge which while extending beyond the limits of possible experience is like- wise to further the highest interests of humanity, is found, so far as speculative philosophy professes to satisfy it, to be grounded in deception, and to destroy itself in the attempt at fulfilment. Yet the severity of our criticism has rendered reason a not unimportant service in proving the impossibility of dogmatically determining, in regard to an object of experi- ence, anything that lies beyond the limits of experience. For in so doing it has secured reason against all possible assertions of the opposite. That cannot be achieved save in one or other of two ways. ++ The 'I think' is, as already stated, an empirical proposition, and contains within itself the proposition 'I exist'. But I cannot say 'Everything which thinks, exists'. For in that case the property of thought would render all beings which possess it necessary beings. My existence cannot, therefore, be regarded as an inference from the proposition 'I think', as Descartes sought to contend -- for it would then have to be preceded by the major premiss 'Everything which thinks, exists' -- but is identical with it. The 'I think' ex- presses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e. perception (and thus shows that sensation, which as such belongs to sensibility, lies at the basis of this existential proposition) But the 'I think' precedes the experience which is required to determine the object of perception through the category in respect of time; and the existence here [referred to] is not a category. The category as such does not apply to an indeterminately given object but only to one of which we have a concept and about which we seek to know whether it does or does not exist outside the concept. An indetermin- ate perception here signifies only something real that is given, given indeed to thought in general, and so not as appearance, nor as thing in itself (noumenon), but as something which actually exists, and which in the proposition, 'I think', is denoted as such. For it must be observed, that when I have called the proposition, 'I think', an empirical proposition, I do not mean to say thereby, that the 'I' in this proposition is an empirical representation. On the contrary, it is purely intellectual, because belonging to thought in general. Without some empirical representation to supply the material for thought, the actus, 'I think', would not, indeed, take place; but the empirical is only the condition of the application, or of the employ- ment, of the pure intellectual faculty. P 379 Either we have to prove our proposition apo- deictically; or, if we do not succeed in this, we have to seek out the sources of this inability, which, if they are traceable to the necessary limits of our reason, must constrain all opponents to submit to this same law of renunciation in respect of all claims to dogmatic assertion. Yet nothing is thereby lost as regards the right, nay, the necessity, of postulating a future life in accordance with the principles of the practical employment of reason, which is closely bound up with its speculative employment. For the merely speculative proof has never been able to exercise any influence upon the common reason of men. It so stands upon the point of a hair, that even the schools preserve it from fall- ing only so long as they keep it unceasingly spinning round like a top; even in their own eyes it yields no abiding founda- tion upon which anything could be built. The proofs which are serviceable for the world at large all preserve their entire value undiminished, and indeed, upon the surrender of these dog- matic pretensions, gain in clearness and in natural force. For reason is then located in its own peculiar sphere, namely, the order of ends, which is also at the same time an order of nature; and since it is in itself not only a theoretical but also a practical faculty, and as such is not bound down to natural conditions, it is justified in extending the order of ends, and therewith our own existence, beyond the limits of experience and of life. If we judged according to analogy with the nature of living beings in this world, in dealing with which reason must necessarily accept the principle that no organ, no faculty, no impulse, indeed nothing whatsoever is either superfluous or disproportioned to its use, and that therefore nothing is pur- poseless, but everything exactly conformed to its destiny in life -- if we judged by such an analogy we should have to re- gard man, who alone can contain in himself the final end of all this order, as the only creature that is excepted from it. Man's natural endowments -- not merely his talents and the impulses to enjoy them, but above all else the moral law within him -- go so far beyond all the utility and advantage which he may derive from them in this present life, that he learns there- by to prize the mere consciousness of a righteous will as being, apart from all advantageous consequences, apart even from the P 380 shadowy reward of posthumous fame, supreme over all other values; and so feels an inner call to fit himself, by his conduct in this world, and by the sacrifice of many of its advantages, for citizenship in a better world upon which he lays hold in idea. This powerful and incontrovertible proof is reinforced by our ever-increasing knowledge of purposiveness in all that we see around us, and by contemplation of the immensity of creation, and therefore also by the consciousness of a certain illimitableness in the possible extension of our knowledge, and of a striving commensurate therewith. All this still remains to us, but we must renounce the hope of comprehending, from the merely theoretical knowledge of ourselves, the necessary continuance of our existence. CONCLUSION, IN REGARD TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PARALOGISM The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from the confusion of an idea of reason -- the idea of a pure intelli- gence -- with the completely undetermined concept of a think- ing being in general. I think myself on behalf of a possible experience, at the same time abstracting from all actual ex- perience; and I conclude therefrom that I can be conscious of my existence even apart from experience and its empirical conditions. In so doing I am confusing the possible abstrac- tion from my empirically determined existence with the sup- posed consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self, and I thus come to believe that I have knowledge that what is substantial in me is the transcendental subject. But all that I really have in thought is simply the unity of con- sciousness, on which, as the mere form of knowledge, all determination is based. The task of explaining the communion of the soul with the body does not properly belong to the psychology with which we are here dealing. For this psychology proposes to prove the personality of the soul even apart from this com- munion (that is, after death), and is therefore transcendent in the proper sense of that term. It does, indeed, occupy itself with an object of experience, but only in that aspect in which P 381 it ceases to be an object of experience. Our teaching, on the other hand, does supply a sufficient answer to this question. The difficulty peculiar to the problem consists, as is generally recognised, in the assumed heterogeneity of the object of inner sense (the soul) and the objects of the outer senses, the formal condition of their intuition being, in the case of the former, time only, and in the case of the latter, also space. But if we consider that the two kinds of objects thus differ from each other, not in- wardly but only in so far as one appears outwardly to the other, and that what, as thing in itself, underlies the appearance of matter, perhaps after all may not be so heterogeneous in character, this difficulty vanishes, the only question that re- mains being how in general a communion of substances is possible. This, however, is a question which lies outside the field of psychology, and which the reader, after what has been said in the Analytic regarding fundamental powers and facul- ties, will not hesitate to regard as likewise lying outside the field of all human knowledge. GENERAL NOTE ON THE TRANSITION FROM RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY TO COSMOLOGY The proposition, 'I think' or 'I exist thinking', is an em- pirical proposition. Such a proposition, however, is conditioned by empirical intuition, and is therefore also conditioned by the object [that is, the self] which is thought [in its aspect] as appearance. It would consequently seem that on our theory the soul, even in thought, is completely transformed into appearance, and that in this way our consciousness itself, as being a mere illusion, must refer in fact to nothing. Thought, taken by itself, is merely the logical function, and therefore the pure spontaneity of the combination of the manifold of a merely possible intuition, and does not exhibit the subject of consciousness as appearance; and this for the sufficient reason that thought takes no account whatsoever of the mode of intuition, whether it be sensible or intellectual. I thereby represent myself to myself neither as I am nor as I appear to myself. I think myself only as I do any object in general from whose mode of intuition I abstract. If I here re- P 382 present myself as subject of thoughts or as ground of thought, these modes of representation do not signify the categories of substance or of cause. For the categories are those functions of thought (of judgment) as already applied to our sensible in- tuition, such intuition being required if I seek to know myself. If, on the other hand, I would be conscious of myself simply as thinking, then since I am not considering how my own self may be given in intuition, the self may be mere appearance to me, the 'I' that thinks, but is no mere appearance in so far as I think; in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the being itself, although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought. The proposition, 'I think', in so far as it amounts to the assertion, 'I exist thinking', is no mere logical function, but determines the subject (which is then at the same time object) in respect of existence, and cannot take place without inner sense, the intuition of which presents the object not as thing in itself but merely as appearance. There is here, therefore, not simply spontaneity of thought, but also receptivity of intui- tion, that is, the thought of myself applied to the empirical intuition of myself. Now it is to this intuition that the thinking self would have to look for the conditions of the employment of its logical functions as categories of substance, cause, etc. , if it is not merely to distinguish itself as object in itself, through the 'I', but is also to determine the mode of its existence, that is, to know itself as noumenon. This, however, is impossible, since the inner empirical intuition is sensible and yields only data of appearance, which furnish nothing to the object of pure consciousness for the knowledge of its separate existence, but can serve only for the obtaining of experience. Should it be granted that we may in due course discover, not in experience but in certain laws of the pure employment of reason -- laws which are not merely logical rules, but which while holding a priori also concern our existence -- ground for regarding ourselves as legislating completely a priori in re- gard to our own existence, and as determining this existence, there would thereby be revealed a spontaneity through which our reality would be determinable, independently of the con- ditions of empirical intuition. And we should also become P 383 aware that in the consciousness of our existence there is con- tained a something a priori, which can serve to determine our existence -- the complete determination of which is possible only in sensible terms -- as being related, in respect of a certain inner faculty, to a non-sensible intelligible world. But this would not be of the least service in furthering the attempts of rational psychology. In this marvellous faculty, which the consciousness of the moral law first reveals to me, I should indeed have, for the determination of my existence, a principle which is purely intellectual. But through what predi- cates would that determination have to be made? They could be no other than those which must be given to me in sensible intuition; and thus I should find myself, as regards rational psychology, in precisely the same position as before, namely, still in need of sensible intuitions to confer meaning on my concepts of understanding (substance, cause, etc. ), through which alone I can have knowledge of myself; and these in- tuitions can never aid me in advancing beyond the field of experience. Nevertheless, in respect of the practical employ- ment, which is always directed to objects of experience, I should be justified in applying these concepts, in conformity with their analogical meaning when employed theoretically, to freedom and the subject that is possessed of freedom. In so doing, however, I should understand by these concepts the merely logical functions of subject and predicate, of ground and consequence, in accordance with which the acts or effects are so determined conformably to those [moral] laws, that they always allow of being explained, together with the laws of nature, in accordance with the categories of substance and cause, although they have their source in an entirely different principle. These observations are designed merely to prevent a misunderstanding to which the doctrine of our self-intuition, as appearance, is particularly liable. We shall have occasion to make further application of them in the sequel.