The Philosopher as a “Secret Agent” for Peace:
Taking Seriously Kant’s Revival of the “Old Question”
Prof. Stephen Palmquist, D.Phil. (Oxon)
Department of Religion and Philosophy
Hong Kong Baptist University
1. Law vs. Philosophy at the Core ofKant’s Conflict
Thelast book Kant completed without assistance, The Conflict of the Faculties (1798), is typically regarded as a merecomposite of three essays on separate themes that are held together with nothingbut an artificial appeal to the four-fold structure of the Prussian university.Philosophy was regarded as the “lower” faculty because it made noattempt to relate directly to the professional training of public servants, butinstead served as a critical tool to help keep the three “higher”faculties in line. The higher faculties of theology, law, and medicine wereeach charged with the duty of training a specific type of public servant:priests, lawyers, and doctors, respectively. The three parts of Kant’s Conflict examine the relationship betweenphilosophy and each of these three disciplines in turn. Or so, at least, heclaims in his Introduction.
Infact, only Part I of Conflict,on the relation between the faculties of philosophy and theology, really livesup to this stated purpose. Instead of writing new and original works for theother two parts, Kant adapted essays he had written previously, probably withother uses originally in mind. Especially the essay appearing as the SecondPart, entitled “An old question raised again: Is the human raceconstantly progressing?”, seems at first to have little or no seriousrelevance to the issue of a philosopher’s duty with regard to both thefaculty of law in general and the challenge to build a more peaceful world inparticular. While both the form and the content of that essay undoubtedly leavesomething to be desired, I believe it offers more insight into the“official” topic (i.e., the relation between the philosophy facultyand the faculty of law) than meets the eye.
Inorder to appreciate the full significance of this Second Part of Conflict, we must first look at its immediatecontext in Kant’s philosophical corpus. Kant originally drafted thatessay roughly three years before it was published, so it should not besurprising that the most relevant context is its relationship to a work Kantpublished at around the same time: Perpetual Peace (1795). In many ways, the latter bookapplies the same reasoning to the topic of international relations that Conflict applies to the structure of auniversity’s faculties.I shall therefore begin the present essay by exploring certain elements in PerpetualPeace that clarify therelevance of what Kant goes on to write about lawyers and philosophers in theSecond Part of Conflict.
2. The “Secret Article” inPerpetual Peace:Irony or Transcendental Condition?
Thearguments and main principles of Perpetual Peace are well known, for this is probably the greatest (and certainly themost widely read) of the various works Kant wrote to supplement his primarysystematic writings. After a brief and rather ironic introduction asking thereader to take him seriously despite the apparently impracticable nature of hisclaims, Section I identifies six “preliminary” requirements anystates must follow in order to set in motion a lasting peace in their relationswith other states. These aremeant to be principles of self-regulation that states can begin to implement ontheir own, even before there isan international “federation of states”, whose task would be tomake perpetual peace a reality. Section II then explains the three“definitive articles” that would need to be adopted by every memberstate. Each would need: (1) to establish a “Republican”Constitution (i.e., a system of government that requires the mode of administration to be based on a “separation ofthe executive power (the administration) from the legislative,” sothat the people who make the laws are not the same as the people who enforcethe laws);(2) to uphold a body of international law enacted by the Federation, so thatstates no longer relate to each other in the uncivilized manner of lawlesssavages, but rather according to self-determined principles of “rationalfreedom;” and (3) tofoster a condition of “Universal Hospitality”, whereby all humanbeings are regarded as “world citizens” with the same basic rights,including “a right of temporary sojourn” in other countries,without being treated as enemies.
Although Kant’s basic argument appears to be complete at thispoint, some of his most interesting ideas appear in the two Supplements and twoAppendices that follow. These sections are also where we find the mostinteresting common ground between Perpetual Peace and the Second Part of Kant’s Conflict. The First Supplement, for example, is a lengthyanalysis of the progress of thehuman race toward the goal of obtaining the kind of lasting peace betweennations that is envisioned in the main part of the book. Here Kant argues thatnature implements a four-stage “mechanism” that guarantees the goalof peace will eventually be reached. In the earliest stage of human history, hostility between different groups ofpeople serves the necessary purpose of encouraging them to spread throughoutthe whole earth. As the earth begins to fill up with people, those living inthe same area must establish laws and create civilizations for their ownself-protection; but as a result, conflicts inevitably arise with neighboringcivilizations, and war is the inevitable result. The third stage begins whensomeone (like Kant) realizes that, in order for peace to exist in spite of the differences that have arisen duringthis process (especially differences in language and religion), a federation ofseparate nations must be established. (We are currently living in this thirdstage, Kant would say, though perhaps not much further along than we were 200years ago.) Finally, as the idea of “world citizenship” becomesmore and more prominent, so that different civilizations come to recognize thatpeace despite our conflicting ideals really is ineveryone’s best interests, the goal of perpetual peace will be realized.
The Second Supplement, unlike the First, is brief and appears to be ofquestionable practical value. However, it will turn out to be of crucialimportance when we assess the relation between Perpetual Peace and the essay that constitutes the Second Part of Conflict. Here in the Second Supplement to PerpetualPeace, Kant introduces a so-called “Secret Article”that he claims must be present “subjectively” in any legislationthat is to succeed in leading the nations of the world along the road toperpetual peace. By this he means that the lawyers who draft the legislationmust have this article in mind, and employ it in practice, even though it isnot “objectively” part of any state Constitution or body ofinternational law. The secretarticle states: “The opinions of philosophers on the conditions of thepossibility of public peace shall be consulted by those states armed for war.”Although few take Kant very seriously at this point, I believe this is an absolutelycrucial part of his planfor enduring world peace. It is essential because if those who draftlegislation depend solely on the objective articles, the path to peace will be devoid of what we mightcall the transcendental conflictthat Kant views as a necessary condition for real peace. That is, legislatorsmust be open to having their professional opinions challenged, analyzed, andsubjected to the judgment of dispassionate reason by those with expertise inthe latter, otherwise their legislation, drafted in a context devoid ofcreative conflict, will fail to establish the desired goal of peace. Unlike Plato, Kant does not expect“[t]hat kings should philosophize or philosophers become kings;”rather, he only asks that those who belong to the faculty of law be willing togive those in the faculty of philosophy a fair hearing. Here Kant is clearlyhinting at what will also turn out to be his central point in The Conflictof the Faculties: thatthe ideal of peaceful conflict within the university is the most effectivemodel we can employ to make real progress on the path toward perpetual peacebetween nations.
AppendixI expounds further on the necessary opposition, or conflict, that exists between“politics” and “morality,” at least as regards theirdifferent functions on the path to peace. Politicians, Kant argues, aretypically immoral because of the inevitable relationship they have to thoseholding power: “they flatter the power which is then ruling so as not tobe remiss in their private advantage, and they sacrifice the nation and,possibly, the whole world.”In direct contrast to philosophers, politicians “make a great show ofunderstanding men… without understanding manand what can be made of him, for they lack the higher point of view ofanthropological observation which is needed for this.”Kant concludes that, although “objectively … there is no conflictbetween morals and politics,” the reality of selfishness and evil inhuman nature necessitates that “[s]ubjectively … this conflict willalways remain.”
PerpetualPeace concludes inAppendix II with an explanation of how “the transcendental concept ofpublic right” can be used to establish harmony “between morality andpolitics”—the necessary condition for lasting peace. Here Kantproposes a “transcendental condition of public law: ‘All actionsrelating to the right of other men are unjust if their maxim is not consistentwith publicity.’”After discussing several examples of this merely “negative”principle, Kant warns that “we cannot infer conversely that the maximswhich bear publicity are therefore just,” because those who wieldsufficient levels of power have little need to conceal their plans, whetherthey are good or not.The affirmative version of this basic transcendental principle is:“‘All maxims which stand in need of publicity in order not to fail theirend, agree with politics and right [i.e., morality] combined.”Careful attention to Kant’s arguments in the apparently incidentalSupplements and Appendices reveals that, if Kant’s plan for perpetualpeace between nations is everto become a reality on earth, then a context must exist wherein philosophers are not only“allowed” but encouraged to engage in open conflict with legal professionals, throughpeaceful public discussion of universal principles relevant to actuallegislation. In the remainder of this paper I shall argue that Kant’stask in the Second Part of Conflictwas to show that such a context already exists, in the form of the university.
3. Conflict between thePhilosophy and Law Faculties as the Model for Perpetual Peace
This brief overview ofKant’s masterpiece on peace provides us with a helpful contextualizationfor understanding the significance of the essay he was also writing around thesame time, which eventually became the Second Part of The Conflict of theFaculties. For what Kantonly hints at in the Second Supplement to Perpetual Peace, that progress toward peace may dependon philosophers (especially academic philosophers) acting almost as spies (or “secret agents”) in thepolitical realm, comes to look more like a serious contender for atranscendental condition for the empirical realization of international peace.In the 1798 publication Kant offers a philosophical interpretation of theactual structure of the Prussian university system, portraying it as a vehiclefor promoting just the sort of open public conflict between philosophers andvarious types of professionals that his previous work had treated as a“subjectively necessary” (i.e., transcendental?) condition forpeace.
The universities ofKant’s day had a far simpler structure than our contemporary universitiestypically do. Instead of a seemingly endless array of departments grouped intoa smaller but still indeterminate number of faculties, the whole systemconsisted of four faculties divided into two types. The three higherfaculties—theology, law, and medicine— were charged with the taskof training the professionals (i.e., priests, lawyers, and doctors) whose taskwas to assist the public in solving problems relating to their moral/spiritualwell-being, their property, and their health, respectively. Philosophy wascalled the lower faculty because its job was not to train professionals but toeducate, examine, and if necessary, chasten all the other faculties in matterspertaining to reason. Kant’s book is divided into three parts, devoted(at least in theory)to an explanation of how the philosophy faculty engages in creative conflictwith each of the three higher faculties.
Kant’s assumption wasthat this ideal of peaceful yet creative conflict in an academic setting can makea difference to thegeneral public, while causing them no harm, because the arguments of thephilosophers can and should change the way priests, lawyers, and doctors dealwith the public. An important difference between the lower and higherfaculties, however, concerns the role of government regulation—an issueKant deals with only incidentally throughout Conflict. (The book, of course, was publishedsoon after the edict preventing Kant from publishing anything on religion hadbeen lifted, so the issue was clearly at the forefront of Kant’s mind.)Because the content taught and published by members of the higher faculties hasa direct influence on those professionals who deal immediately with the public,the government has a responsibility to regulate what is taught by thesefaculties; the philosophy faculty, by contrast, does not train professionalsand therefore should not have to answer to any authority other than reason. Inthis way, it fulfills a crucial role in any republican state, by providing a“checks and balances” system from within the state-sponsorededucational system itself. When the potential of this system is fully realized,academic debate can not only exemplify the kind of healthy conflict that hasthe potential to make society a wiser and safer place to live; it can alsoactually bring aboutthe goal of peace through its indirect effect on the general public.
Unfortunately, Kant’sstated plan for this book was more of an idealized hope than an accurateaccount of what is actually written therein. For as mentioned previously, theonly part that is treated in full accordance with his stated goal (i.e., toshow how the philosophy faculty, through its emphasis on rationalself-criticism, can deepen and further the insights of the other faculties,while chastening their improprieties) is Part I, on the theology faculty. The othertwo parts only tangentially touch on the specific issue of conflict between philosophers and the relevantprofessionals (i.e., lawyers or doctors). As a result of this defect in thecomposition of Kant’s book, perhaps excusable due to his old age at thetime of publication, the only detailed explanation of how empirical conflict inan academic setting can pave the way for peace is to be found in his account ofthe relationship between philosophers and theologians.
Thetheology faculty, according to Kant, adopts a wholly different standpoint fromthe philosophy faculty. Members of the two faculties are, in many respects,enemies—or perhaps “warring neighbors” would be anappropriate metaphor.This is because the fundamental basis of the theology faculty’s authorityis its appeal to divine revelation. The Word of God (i.e., the Holy Scriptureof whatever religious tradition is being taught), and the Spirit of God (i.e.,the presence of God’s voice in the interpreter’s heart, leading himor her to formulate the right interpretation) are the fundamental basis for allconsideration, both theoretical and practical. By contrast, the philosophyfaculty’s authority is grounded in reason alone. Because theologians mustinevitably make useof reason whenever they interpret or apply the statements they find inScripture, they are necessarily subject to the philosopher’s criticalanalysis. Conversely, philosophers may offer interpretations and applicationsof Scriptural statements withoutsubjecting themselves to the doctrinal restrictions of orthodoxy, because they(the philosophers) never step outside of their role as messengers of reason. Ifthis paper were about religion and the conflicts between different religions,we would need to examine this part of Kant’s book in great detail. But itis not; our concern is rather with politics and how philosophers can helpperpetuate peace amidst the conflicts between different states. I shalltherefore resist the temptation to make further observations about Kant’sviews on the philosopher’s conflict with the theologian.
Inapplying the same principle of free and open (i.e., unregulated, yet peaceful)conflict in a university-based setting to the faculty of law, Kant’sintention would obviously be to suggest that the philosopher’s role is toprovide a universal, rational standpoint for assessing and improving our actualempirical legislation. The essay that actually appears as the Second Part of Conflict deals only with the far more limitedissue of whether “the human race [is] constantly progressing”.Our overview of Perpetual Peace showedthat this same issue was also the focus of the First Supplement in that work.We must therefore keep in mind that such progress was crucial to determiningthe potential success of his overall political vision. If the human race is notprogressing, then thephilosopher has no reason even to try to be a secret agent for peace.
A few of Kant’sarguments in the Second Part of Conflict can be applied fairly easily to the university setting. Forexample, when he explains how the future of human history can be known a prioriby noting such knowledge is possible “if the diviner himself makes and contrives the events which heannounces in advance,”we can surmise that this would be one of the key differences between the waythe faculty of law and the faculty of philosophy deal with legal issues.Members of the faculty of law, strictly speaking, would have the sole task ofteaching and interpreting the given body of law, as handed down by whatever authorityholds sovereign power in the state (i.e., the monarch, the aristocracy, or thepeople as a whole). Members of the faculty of philosophy, by contrast, wouldhave the task of determining in advance what law reason determines as best, and then comparing theexisting body of law with this ideal in order to assess its validity.Beyond this, we can infer that Kant’s underlying intention was to suggestthat perpetual peace between nations will become a reality only whenphilosophers are given the right (at least“subjectively”—i.e., unofficially, or “insecret”) to participate fully in the dialogue over matters of policy aswell as in the character development of politicians—e.g., through moraland philosophical education.
Althoughthe Second Part of Conflictdoes not deal directly with the conflict between philosophers and lawyers inthe university, we may glean some important insights by looking further intowhat Kant does say there about the issue of world peace and its relation todifferent approaches to conflict. After making the above point aboutforeknowledge being a form of self-fulfilling prophecy, Kant goes on to comparepoliticians who institute laws aimed at preventing revolt (but who thereby create the very conditions for revolt) withpreachers who “prophesy the complete destruction of religion and theimminent appearance of the Antichrist; and in doing so they are performingprecisely what is requisite to call him up.”Next, Kant proposes three possible scenarios that would make prediction possible:the human race must either be “in continual retrogression toward wickedness, or in perpetual progression toward improvement …, or ineternal stagnation inits present stage of moral worth …”.He refers to the first option as “moral terrorism,” but points out problems with allthree options that make them equally untenable. Experience can never be asufficient basis for solving “the problem of progress” becausehuman beings are freeand can at any point in time act in accordance with either a good or an evildisposition: what people “ought to do may be dictated in advance, but … it may not be predicted what they will do …”.To assume otherwise would be to adopt “the standpoint of Providence whichis situated beyond all human wisdom;” for only God can experience thefuture before it happens.
Nevertheless, Kant suggeststhat, if a “prophetic history” is to be advanced in a philosophicalmanner, “some experience” must be cited as an empirical groundingfor one’s reasoning.A good example of such an experience, he claims, is the reaction of the generalpublic in France to the revolution that had begun in 1789; he interprets thisreaction as a clear sign of two moral causes operating in the society:
first, that of the right, that a nation must not be hindered inproviding itself with a civil constitution, which appears good to the peoplethemselves; and second, that of the end …, that that same national constitution alone be just and morally good in itself, created insuch a way as to avoid, by its very nature, principles permitting offensivewar.
What reason can discern as the“pure” (a priori) lesson to be drawn from this experience is thatpeople are inclined, as a matter of their inner moral nature, “tostriv[e] after … a republican constitution.”This memorable experience “has revealed a faculty in human nature for improvement suchthat no politician … might have conjured out of the course of thingshitherto existing …”.On this basis, Kant advances a “philosophical prophecy”: “thehuman race has always been in progress toward the better and will continue tobe so henceforth.”
Althoughthe bulk of this part of Kant’s book does not deal very explicitly withthe actual conflict between the university faculties of philosophy and law, hedoes emphasize at one point (in §8) that “public instruction of thepeople in its duties and rights vis-ą-vis the state to which theybelong” constitutes nothing less than “Enlightenment” itself.He then argues that the “free professors of law” who are “thenatural heralds and expositors of these” duties and rights must not bethe ones “officially appointed by the state” (i.e., members of thehigher faculty of law, and all the professionals—lawyers andjudges—who are taught by them); rather, they are “philosophers who,precisely because this freedom is allowed to them, are objectionable to thestate, which always desires to rule alone …”.Only philosophers are fully equipped to teach “the eternal norm”(or “Platonic ideal”)of “a constitution in harmony with the natural right of humanbeings,” a norm “for all civil organization in general” that“averts all war.”For “the duty of the monarchs”—and in a democratic system,the people themselvesare the monarch—is “to treat people according to principles whichare commensurate with the spirit of laws of freedom (as a nation with matureunderstanding would prescribe them for itself);” and philosophers, unlikethe members of the faculty of law, are able to convey this insight to thepublic, for they appeal to reason as their sole authority.
4. Can Philosophers Be Secret (i.e.,Transcendental) Agents for Peace?
HadKant paid more attention to the stated theme of his Conflict book in its Second Part, he surely wouldhave said more about the disputes that will inevitably arise betweenphilosophers who attempt to take up this duty (i.e., to educate the public inthe true nature of law) and the legal professionals and teachers who teachmerely the status quo.Instead, the remainder of his essay merely clarifies two concluding points.These points also raise for us the concluding question of this paper: doesKant’s vision of the philosopher as a secret agent for peace have anymeaningful application in today’s academic and political context?
First, the successfulimplementation of Kant’s plan—starting, we may presume, with anopenness in university law faculties to input from philosophers—will giverise only to a legallybetter society, where people’s external actions conform to principles ofcivility, without necessarily requiring any change in the moral corruption ofhuman nature; as such, his plan must be distinguished from all utopian visions, whereby a religious revolution based on “a kind of newcreation (supernatural influence) would be necessary.” This point coincides nicely with the distinction Kant makes in the firstAppendix to Perpetual Peace,between the moral and political realms. Once again, we can see how these twoessays feed into each other. The philosopher as secret agent is not concernedso much with the moralimprovement of the human race (this would be an issue of concern only for thephilosopher who is dialoguing with the theologian), as with how we can improvethe quality of civil society,the external relations between persons and between states.
Second, the plan can beexpected to succeed only if it is implemented “from top to bottom”—i.e., according to “awell-weighed plan of the sovereign power”—for the simple reasonthat if the state is not supporting the plan, then it will have “no moneyleft … for the salaries of its teachers who are capable and zealouslydevoted to their spheres of duty, since it uses all the money for war.”Thus, even with all its imperfections and awkwardness, the existing Second Partof The Conflict of the Facultiesdoes provide ample evidence to enable us to conclude that for Kant theuniversity was to be the primary context wherein, through the education of the public in an approachto law that is grounded in reason, the drama of the evolution of the human racefrom a random collection of warring nations to a single, peacefully coexistingpartnership of nations with radically conflicting ideas, would evolve.
Thefact that Kant closes his essay with these two points, and that the same twopoints are also made with even greater force in Perpetual Peace, indicates how serious Kant meant us totake his mandate. The otheraspects of Kant’s plan in Perpetual Peace have already had a major influence onthe thinking of politicians and political philosophers in the shaping of publicpolicy during the intervening two centuries. Yet such attempts have still beenfar from eliminating war: the century that saw the creation of the UnitedNations and the institution of a whole body of international law aimed atprotecting universal human rights also witnessed the most horrifying atrocities ever committed byhuman beings against other human beings throughout the whole history ofhumanity’s time on earth. As technology advances, governments have becomemore adept at killingoff their perceived enemies and less willing to sit down with them and dialogue until they reachthe point where they can find a way to live in peace in spite of theirconflicting perspectives.
Although he acknowledges anatural purpose for war in the early stages of human civilization, Kant arguesthat this initial purpose has long since been fulfilled, rendering warunnecessary in the modern era. Cultural differences, including differences oflanguage and of religion, should now be viewed in an altogether differentlight, as shades and hues on the single tapestry of humanity itself. As we sawso clearly from our review of Kant’s Conflict, these differences are not to beabolished, but highlighted,if the beautiful image of one world at peace with itself is to become areality. Here, as throughout his major critical writings, Kant sees conflictnot as an evil to be abolished but as a preliminary step on the road toconcord. Despite its idealistic overtones, Kant seemed to be quite serious inpromoting his plan as a realistic solution to the greatest human social problem, war. Why, then, do the conflicts we havewitnessed during the past centuries, and in recent years, so rarely lead to thecreative concord Kant had in mind? That is, why is war an even greater problemtoday—especially given the threat from weapons of massdestruction—than it was in Kant’s day?
Kant’sanswer, I suggest, would be that the world’s universities in general, andtheir philosophy departments in particular, have largely failed to realizetheir calling as the agents for peace in their respective societies. This may be due in part to alack of receptiveness on the part of governments and/or the law schools andthose trained by them to give ear to the rational arguments being put forwardby philosophers. But in larger part the responsibility lies with philosophersthemselves, who in a majority of cases are quite happy to live in the falsepeace of their ivory towers, talking only with each other about the problems and issues theyshould be promoting in the public square. Is it any wonder that few outside thediscipline of philosophy have listened seriously to what we philosophers havebeen saying?
As philosophers, we must takeseriously our potential role as peacemakers by encouraging our governments toadopt policies of engagement that promote balance and mutual respect betweendifferent nations and people groups. Although our modern universities arestructured differently from those in Kant’s day, with the departments ofphilosophy no longer enjoying a privileged position—indeed, in someuniversities they no longer exist at all!—we should still aim to practiceKant’s high ideal of peaceful, creative conflict. If Kant could send usany message from his resting place in the grave, I believe it would be toremind us philosophers that we really can help solve contemporary politicalproblems, and that once we realize this fact, we shall find we are closer thanwe ever before realized to the day when all the nations on earth, despite theirradically conflicting perspectives, may live together in lasting peace.
 See my paper,“Kant’s Ideal of the University as a Model for World Peace”(presented at the conference, “Two Hundred Years After Kant”, heldin Tehran, Iran, 20-22 November, 2004), especially section 1, for details ofthe role conflict played throughout Kant’s mature writings.
 In brief, these preliminary requirements are: (1) the only valid peacetreaties shall be those that do not provide a justification for some futurewar; (2) nations must not be treated as objects that can be bought, inherited,exchanged, or otherwise manipulated by larger nations; (3) armies mustgradually be abolished; (4) a nation must not use credit to pay for anymilitary conflict; (5) no nation shall use force to interfere with the internalgovernance of another nation; and (6) if or when a war is unavoidable, nonation shall engage in dishonorable strategies in carrying out their hostileacts. See Immanuel Kant, PerpetualPeace, tr. Lewis White Beck in OnHistory, ed. Lewis White Beck(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963), 343-347. Page numbersrefer to the pagination of the German Akademie edition, provided in the margin of the translation.
Perpetual Peace, 352. Any governmentthat allows the ones who make the laws also to administer them is necessarily despotic, even if thedespotism is hidden under the cloak of a popular, democratic vote. Democracywithout separation of powers (i.e., non-republican democracy) is despoticbecause “ ‘all’ decide for or even against one who does notagree; that is, ‘all,’ who are not quite all, decide, and this is acontradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom.”
Perpetual Peace, 354f. Perhaps the mostfundamental among the principles of international law is that thefederation’s purpose cannot be that of establishing “a law ofnations as a right to make war” (356). Kant goes on to say (357):“The only conceivable meaning of such a law of nations [i.e., conceivedas a right to make war] might be that it serves men right who are so inclinedthat they should destroy each other and thus find perpetual peace in the vastgrave that swallows both the atrocities and their perpetrators.”
 Perpetual Peace, 358.
 Perpetual Peace, 368.
 Perpetual Peace, 368.
 Objective legislationmade withoutthe controlling conflict of the philosopher’s voice echoing in thesubjective background will never lead to world peace, because on their own,lawyers can be expected to do nothing other than look after their own selfinterest. As Kant puts it (Perpetual Peace, 369): “The lawyer, who has madenot only the scales of right but also the sword of justice his symbol,generally uses the latter not merely to keep back all foreign influences fromthe former, but, if the scale does not sink the way he wishes, he also throwsthe sword into it…, a practice to which he often has the greatesttemptation because he is not also a philosopher, even in morality.”
 Perpetual Peace, 373.
 Perpetual Peace, 374. Kant proceeds toexplain three rather cynical (though all too often, penetratingly accurate!)“maxims” that guide the typical professional at law. He thenchallenges his reader to stand up and be courageous in fighting against thisfeature of modern culture (376): “Let us … force the falserepresentatives of power to confess that they do not plead in favor of theright but in favor of might.”
 Perpetual Peace, 379.
 Perpetual Peace, 381.
 Perpetual Peace, 385.
 Perpetual Peace, 386.
 Since Kant wrote muchof this book earlier, he may have initially conceived of the idea of publishingit as a book around the same time he wrote Perpetual Peace. Kant had to wait untilthe Prussian king died in 1798 to publish The Conflict of the Faculties, because the First Partdealt with his religious views, which he had been banned from publishing duringthe reign of that king.
 See note 15, and thefurther discussion of this issue in the main text, below.
 Kant uses a similar,territorial metaphor in the Preface to the first edition of his 1793 book, Religionwithin the Bounds of Bare Reason. This was the book whose publication wasregarded by the king’s censor as a violation of the edict againstpublishing anything contrary to the church’s official position on mattersof religion. The Preface discusses the basic differences between what Kantthere calls the “philosophical theologian” and the “biblicaltheologian,” concluding that the two neighbors, despite their fundamentaldifferences, have the potential to be “at one,” if only they willrespect each other’s fundamental perspectives and work towards mutualself-understanding.
 I have, however,discussed this issue in significant depth in two other publications: first, inmy book, Kant’s Critical Religion: Volume Two of Kant’s Systemof Perspectives(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), especially Chapter IX; and second, in my essay,“Philosophers in the Public Square: A Religious Resolution ofKant’s Conflict of the Faculties,” Chapter 12 in Kant and theNew Philosophy of Religion, ed. Chris L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).
 Immanuel Kant, TheConflict of the Faculties, tr. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 79. Page numbers refer to the Germanpagination provided in the margin. Section numbers, where cited, refer toKant’s numbered sections in Part 2 of the book.
 Conflict, 80 (§2).
 This is precisely whatKant did in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, only as applied to thefaculty of theology. The Preface to the second edition of that work describesthese two tasks (determining in advance what rational religion should be, thencomparing one empirical religion with that ideal) as the two“experiments” being conducted in that work. Kant’s decisionnot to address directly (in the Second Part of Conflict) the need for such apair of experiments as applied to the faculty of law might suggest thatKant’s own experience of a very real threat of legal prosecution, as aresult of his own violation of government censorship, was simply too fresh inhis mind for him to address the issue explicitly, even after the censorship waslifted. Perhaps he was all too aware that his own failure to take up the roleof a true philosopher in that situation would have been all-too-apparent, hadhe written the Second Part in the same direct way he wrote the First Part.
 Conflict, 80 (§2).
 Conflict, 81 (§3).Kant’s use of the words “continual”, “perpetual”,and “eternal” provide further evidence that Kant is here dealingwith essentially the same theme he was addressing in Perpetual Peace.
 Conflict, 83 (§4).
 Conflict, 84 (§4).
 Conflict, 84 (§5).
 Conflict, 89 (§8).
 Conflict, 87-88 (§7).
 Conflict, 88 (§7), emphasisadded. Kant’s use of the term “faculty” here refers, ofcourse, to a power of the mind, not to a university department. This parallelusage of the same term does suggest, however, that a metaphorical relationshipexists (or should exist) between these two organizational structures.
 Conflict, 88-89 (§7). Kantqualifies this prophetic proposition in a way that could be regarded asforeshadowing Nietzsche’s übermensch: “provided atleast that there does not, by some chance, occur a second epoch of naturalrevolution which will push aside the human race to clear the stage for othercreatures…” (89).
 Conflict, 89 (§8).
 Conflict, 89 (§8).
 Conflict, 90-91 (§8).
 Conflict, 91-92 (§9).
 Conflict, 92-93 (§10).
This etext is based on a prepublication draft of the published version of this essay.
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